Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, Fall 1999 v30 i1 p249
U.S.-China scientific exchange: A case study of state-sponsored scientific internationalism during the Cold War and beyond.= ZUOYUE WANG.
Full Text: COPYRIGHT 1999 University of
ZUOYUE WANG [*]
IN FEBRUARY 1972 President Richard Nixon of the
Despite its considerable significance, scientific exchange has often been
treated as a sideline in U.S.-China relations. Several excellent studies
examine U.S.-China academic and educational exchanges, but they barely touc=
h on
the scientific components, thus obscuring the part that science and technol=
ogy
played in the developing relationship. Most of these studies focus on the
impact of academic exchanges in the
This paper examines the U.S.-China scientific reopening as a case study = of scientific nationalism and internationalism. Here we are concerned not so m= uch with specific exchange projects as with the political context and implicati= ons of the exchange as a whole. What, for example, did the exchange mean to Chi= nese science and Chinese scientists, many of whom had suffered, along with other intellectuals, horrible persecution at the hands of Mao Zedong's radical Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution? How did American scientists respond = to the new opportunities? Above all, what does this story of scientific exchan= ge tell us about scientific nationalism and internationalism during the Cold W= ar?
In considering these questions, we will look not only at the two national
scientific communities involved but at also the special subnational group of
Chinese American scientists who were crucial in the forging of this new
international scientific network. They, along with Chinese scientists who w=
ere
trained in the
State-sponsored scientific internationalism
The U.S.-China scientific exchange provides a case of what might be term=
ed
state-sponsored scientific internationalism during the Cold War, when
nation-states, often for geopolitical reasons, established the framework for
communication and collaboration among scientists across national boundaries.
This was in contrast to the more traditional, private form of scientific
internationalism that relied on personal scientific communication before Wo=
rld
War II. Prominent examples of the latter included the travel of scientists =
to
enemy territories in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to conduct
scientific research. [3] The state was mostly absent or passive. Nationalism
did surge during and immediately following World War I, as Entente scientis=
ts
launched a boycott against their German colleagues. Max Planck lamented the
division as an "unnatural mixture of science and politics." [4] Y=
et,
it was often the national scientific communities, in
World War II, especially the Manhattan Project, started state
internationalism in science in earnest, although traditional, personal netw=
orks
among scientists continued to play an important role. To make the atomic bo=
mb,
the
U.S.-China scientific contacts
U.S.-China scientific contacts during the Cold War followed the same pat=
tern
of state domination, as the governments determined the nature and degree of
exchanges, if any, on the basis of international and domestic politics. When
the Chinese Communists took over the mainland in 1949, American scientists =
lost
touch with their many former students and colleagues in
Wiesner's conflicting signals reflected Kennedy's ambivalence. On the one
hand, Kennedy believed that
Months earlier, Walt Whitman, science advisor to the Secretary of State,=
had
advised Harrison Brown, a geochemist at the California Institute of Technol=
ogy
who wanted to invite Chinese scientists for a conference, that the State
Department saw no objection, provided that Brown would "select those f=
or
invitation whose primary interests are scientific rather than political.&qu=
ot;
Whitman could not, however, guarantee that "anyone invited will be
admitted to the
The door for scientific and cultural exchange opened finally with Nixon's trip in 1972. [18] In the famous Shanghai Communique signed by Premier Zhou Enlai and Nixon during the visit, science and technology figured prominentl= y in the new bilateral relationship: [19]
The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports, and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each = side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and excha= nge.
Both the
The exchange carried great significance for Chinese leaders concerned wi=
th
rapid economic development, especially Premier Zhou and his protege Deng
Xiaoping, who would become supreme leader of
In many ways, Zhou became the gatekeeper in scientific exchange with the=
Zhou viewed scientific exchange with the
When the CSCPRC meeting in the Great Hall ended, Seaborg wrote in his di=
ary,
Zhou shook hands with delegation members and commented to Emil L. Smith,
biochemist at UCLA and CSCPRC chairman, that he understood that the committ=
ee
was formed in the mid-1960s but was only effective after Nixon's contacts w=
ith
the Chinese leaders. "Doesn't this mean that President Nixon has done
something good?" Zhou asked. Emil Smith agreed. Then the premier threw=
up
his hands and said, "But oh, Watergate!" When Smith reassured Zhou
that he did not think that the political turmoil in the
Reactions of American scientists
Following this meeting with Zhou Enlai, the CSCPRC, operating within the
National Academy of Sciences and with funds from the
The U.S.-China exchange also gave American scientists, especially former
government advisers such as the alumni of the President's Science Advisory
Committee (PSAC), a chance to pursue arms control through an outside channe=
l.
For many of them, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) now became th=
eir
institutional platform of choice, and the FAS happily met with a favorable
reception by the Chinese government as a progressive scientific group. Amer=
ican
scientists seized the opportunity to show a skeptical
Impact on Chinese scientists
Despite, or perhaps because of, the geopolitical designs of the Chinese
government, Chinese scientists stood to reap the greatest benefit from the
U.S.-China reopening and scientific exchange. During the Cultural Revolutio=
n,
thousands of Chinese scientists, especially those senior scientists trained=
in
the
The stunning reversal of U.S.-China relations and images of Mao Zedong a=
nd
Zhou Enlai shaking hands with Richard Nixon in the midst of the political
turmoil brought political relief to many scientists. When visiting American
scientists asked to see Chinese scientists whom they knew from the past, the
attention often helped to improve the personal and professional conditions =
of
these scientists. [34] About fifty Chinese scientists and science
administrators, for example, participated in Zhou's meeting in 1973 with the
CSCPRC delegation. Seaborg recalled that the Chinese scientists showed obvi=
ous
pleasure in this rare opportunity to meet with Zhou and their American
colleagues and that the meeting greatly "increased their legitimacy in=
Before Mao's death and the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976, however,
Chinese scientists ran political and personal risks by taking part in
exchanges. As Seaborg learned when he revisited
The significance of the U.S.-China scientific exchange should also be vi=
ewed
in the context of a major politically and ideologically charged science pol=
icy
debate over basic research. During the Cultural Revolution, scientists had
defended basic research as the foundation of technological advances; the
radicals denounced it as a reactionary bourgeois ideology of science. [38] =
In
early 1970, some senior scientists associated with the
Zhu's hope for a moderate science policy was soon dashed, if only
temporarily, when the
High school students had to work several years after graduation before t= hey could go to college on recommendations of local party leaders. The curricul= um emphasized practical skills over theoretical training. [44]
Foreign scientists visiting Chinese universities in the early 1970s were
impressed by the emphasis on practical applications, but many of them also
questioned the lack of balance. Among those who raised the issue of basic
research with Zhou Enlai was Chen Ning Yang. Yang, a Chinese American physi=
cist
then at the State University of New York, Stony Brook, was well known in
Zhou discussed Yang's suggestion with Mao, as he told a group of visiting Chinese American scientists and scholars on July 14, 1972. "Yang's talk was very honest," Zhou said, "the Chairman praised him after read= ing [the transcript of] his talk." Zhou called on Zhou Peiyuan, present at= the meeting as vice-president of Beijing University and the Chinese Academy of Sciences, to help him promote basic research at Beijing University and the country. [47] "I believe that the research institutes in the Academy of Sciences should focus on basic science," the premier wrote Zhou Peiyuan following the meeting. He continued: [48]
Whenever there was a [political] movement, basic research was always the first to he targeted. For this, the Academy of Sciences should also take so= me blame, because it was afraid of producing no achievement in the short term = and thus becoming a target of attacks. [In fact] the consistent policy of the P= arty Central
Committee has always been that the Academy of Sciences should be respons= ible for basic research, only in the past this was not realized.
Chinese scientists seized the opportunity afforded by the visiting Ameri= can scientists' advocacy for basic research to advance not only the cause for b= asic research, but also the political fortunes of Chinese science in general.
High energy physics in China
High energy physics is not representative of all scientific fields in Ch= ina (or in the West): it is big, expensive, and often highly politicized science with attendant controversies. Yet, an examination of the development of this field in China gives a good example of how Chinese scientists took advantag= e of the U.S.-China scientific exchanges both scientifically and politically. For several reasons, high energy physics became the most prestigious field of a= ll the sciences in China in the 1970s. Mao Zedong's philosophical penchant for= the infinite divisibility of matter gave the study of the structure of matter a welcome ideological justification on which the physicists capitalized. [49] During the Cultural Revolution, a group of Chinese theorists devised the ideologically correct "straton model" to explain the structure of elementary particles, which resembled in some ways the quark theory develop= ed in the West. [50] The fact that some of the major participants in the bomb projects turned to high energy phy sics gave credibility to the enterprise = in the eyes of government officials. The high visibility of the Chinese Americ= an particle physicists Yang and Lee in China also helped ensure a great follow= ing for the field among Chinese students.
Seeing high energy physics as a frontier field in science that happened = to enjoy Mao's personal interest, Zhou Enlai sought to promote its development= as a way to revitalize Chinese science and technology in general and to facili= tate international scientific exchange. When a group of nuclear physicists in the Second Ministry of Machinery (nuclear weapons) began to agitate for a Chine= se program in high energy physics in 1972, Zhou quickly responded. [51] On September 11, 1972, in a letter to Zhang Wenyu, the leader of the group who= was trained in Britain and worked in the U.S. in the 1940s and 1950s, [52] and = Zhu Guangya, another U.S. trained nuclear physicist who participated in the Chi= nese bomb projects and who was then deputy director of the powerful Defense Scie= nce and Technology Commission, [53] Zhou asked them to coordinate the formation= of a national program: [54]
This matter cannot be delayed any longer. The Academy of Sciences must f= ocus on basic science and theoretical research, and at the same time also closely unite theoretical research and scientific experiment. High energy physics research and the preparatory research on high energy accelerators should be= one of the main projects of the Academy of Sciences.
On September 18, 1972, Zhu Guangya gathered people from the Second Minis= try, the academy, and Beijing University for a conference on the topic. They wro= te a report to Zhou Enlai on January 8, 1973, proposing that the Chinese high en= ergy program focus on elementary particle research, without neglecting nuclear physics and applications. Institutionally, the group advocated that China establish an Institute on High Energy Physics based on Zhang's group and construct experimental sites, including preparatory work on accelerators and detectors. It also suggested that Beijing University, Lanzhou University, a= nd Yunnan University (the last two in southwestern China) strengthen their high energy physics programs by conducting research and training scientists. Internationally, the group proposed that the government send a delegation to CERN (European Center for Nuclear Research). The State Council approved the= report and a national conference on high energy physics was held from March 13 to April 7, 1973. [55] In a wri tten statement for the conference, Zhou quoted= Mao to the effect that "China should make a greater contribution to humankind" to justify an expensive national program in high energy physics. [56]
The efforts of the Chinese high energy physicists received a boost from = the visit of T.D. Lee in 1972. In a wide-ranging discussion with Zhou Enlai on science and education in Beijing on October 14 of that year, Lee encouraged Zhou to launch China's own high energy physics program. He also urged Zhou = to invite foreign scientists for visits and to send Chinese students and scientists abroad for study and research. [57] Lee assured Zhou that CERN a= nd many other laboratories in the West would welcome Chinese scientists and th= at the exchanges would not create a "Two Chinas" problem because he = did not believe that Taiwan was interested in high energy research. [58]
Lee and other Chinese American scientists brought to China not only the state of the art in science, but also social, cultural, and institutional approaches to the modernization of Chinese science and technology. Zhou was curious about science policy in the U.S. and the West. He asked Lee about h= ow collaboration was carried out in the U.S., to which Lee responded by descri= bing the peer review process and highlighting, perhaps inadvertently, the autono= my of the scientific community. "A group of scientists makes a proposal a= fter discussions among themselves," Lee said, "then [the government] selects about ten renowned scientists from all over the country to evaluate= the proposal, deciding which will be done first, which will be done later, and which would not be done at all. The national government provides all the laboratories. As to research that could lead to development and application= s, such as semiconductors and computer research, capitalists provided some of = the laboratories." [59]
As a result of Lee's urging and Zhou's backing, high energy physics beca= me one of the first fields where extensive exchange with the West began. In May 1973, Zhang Wenyu led a high energy physics delegation to the U.S., visiting Brookhaven National Laboratory, Fermilab, and the Stanford Linear Accelerat= or (SLAC) Center. The group next stopped at CERN before returning to China in early July 1973. Upon their return, the Chinese physicists recommended a 40= -GeV proton synchrotron "comparable with the world's biggest accelerator,&q= uot; evidently aiming for both scientific achievements and national prestige. The move disappointed T.D. Lee and Wolfgang Panofsky, then director of SLAC, who had suggested a less expensive electron-positron collider with lower energy= but high intensity and potential for applications in other fields. [60] Zhou ga= ve the proton project the green light when he approved a report on the subject= by the Chinese Academy of Sciences in March 1975. [61]
Despite Zhou's repeated personal interventions on its behalf before his death in January 1976, the project did not begin in earnest until after the collapse in 1976 of the Gang of Four, who attacked the high energy physics program as one of Zhou's pet projects. The Chinese Academy of Sciences organized a national symposium on high energy physics in Beijing in March 1= 977, with the participation of 220 scientists from all over the country. The conference confirmed the earlier decision to build a proton synchrotron at = 40 GeV. [62] Shortly thereafter, the Chinese government under Hua Guofeng, who backed a grandiose modernization plan on the expected revenue from oil expo= rts, decided to push the energy level to 50 GeV. [63] Hua's "great leap outward" (yang yuejin), as his modernization plan came to be called, turned out to be terribly unrealistic.
Economic retrenchment ensued in 1980-1981, which forced the cancellation= of the proton accelerator. After two years of soul-searching among Chinese and Chinese American scientists, the Chinese Academy of Sciences came back, in 1983, to Lee's original proposal of building an electron collider, with an energy level now set at 2.2 GeV. Deng Xiaoping, who emerged as China's supr= eme leader, personally approved the new design. [64] On October 7, 1984, Deng, along with other top party and government leaders, joined Chinese and Ameri= can physicists at a much-publicized ceremony marking the start of the construct= ion of the Beijing Electron Positron Collider (BEPC). The operation of the mach= ine since its successful completion in October 1988 has been hailed both as a contribution to world science and as an example of how basic research could bring practical benefits in the form of medical and industrial applications= , an emphasis that was in line with the new utilitarian science policy in the Dengist era of market refor m. [65]
Chinese American scientists
The pivotal roles of C. N. Yang in the debate over basic research and T.= D. Lee in the development of the high energy physics program provide examples = of the profound and at times conflicting influence of Chinese American scienti= sts in Chinese science and politics. Hundreds of Chinese American scientists and professionals visited China in the 1970s, including such prominent figures = as the mathematician S.S. Chern of UC Berkeley, the architect I.M. Pei, and physicists C.K. Jen of Johns Hopkins, Samuel Ting of MIT, and C.S. Wu of Columbia. Wu was the first (and so far only) female and Chinese physicist elected president of the American Physical Society, in 1975. Many of these Chinese American scientists were first-generation immigrants, who received = their undergraduate education in China and came to the U.S. in the 1930s and 1940s for graduate training, often with funding from the then Nationalist governm= ent of China. In the 1970s, they carried out scientific exchanges with China in= the name of scientific inter nationalism, but their strongest motivation was probably nationalism in the sense of an identity with the developmental aspirations of their country of origin. [66]
Their active participation in the U.S.-China scientific exchange was per= haps the single most important factor in determining the success and character of this transnational scientific network, and in many ways reflected the unique history of this subnational scientific community. In turn, the U.S.-China reopening energized Chinese American scientists who had until then maintain= ed, as a group, a minimal presence in the U.S. scientific community or the publ= ic at large. It aided in the formation of the Chinese American scientific community and gave it a voice not only in science but in public policy in t= he U.S. and China.
For all their contributions to American science, Chinese scientists had a bittersweet history in the United States. Racial discrimination often marked their earliest social experiences in the United States during the era of Chinese Exclusion, which lasted from the turn of the century to World War I= I, when most Chinese were not allowed to become permanent residents or citizen= s. Even as late as 1954, developers in New Jersey refused to sell a house to Y= ang, then a member of the Institute of Advanced Studies at Princeton. The develo= per was afraid that "our being Chinese might affect his sales," Yang recalled. [67] When the Chinese Communists won the civil war against the U.S.-backed Nationalist forces in 1949, many Chinese students decided to re= turn to China. Having detested the corrupt Nationalist government and experienced humiliating discrimination in the U.S., these students placed great hope in= a new China, where the government appeared to focus on national reconstructio= n and appreciate the role of science and scientists.
The Korean War that broke out in the summer of 1950, however, soon closed the window of opportunity for Chinese students and scholars who wanted to return to their homeland. The U.S. government forbade Chinese nationals, especially those specializing in science and engineering, to return to Chin= a. The ensuing McCarthyist Red Scare targeted, among others, Chinese scientists suspected of left-wing activities and associations. All of these measures further alienated many Chinese scientists and engineers.
The best known example of the disillusioned Chinese scientist in the U.S. was Qian Xuesen (Hsue-Sen Tsien), an aerodynamic scientist at the California Institute of Technology. As a favorite student of Theodor von Karman, Qian = rose to the top of the profession in the 1940s, helped found the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and contributed to U.S. weapons development during World War II= . As an indication of his expertise and of the U.S. government's trust in him, Q= ian was selected to be a member of von Karman's expedition to Europe during Wor= ld War II to investigate the progress of German aerodynamics. In the postwar period, Qian became a member of the influential Air Force Scientific Adviso= ry Board, despite the fact that he remained a Chinese national. He applied for U.S. citizenship in 1949. [68] Trust turned into suspicion during the McCar= thy era when he was charged as a Communist Party member and a spy for Communist China. The U.S. government put him under house arrest for five years and prohibited him from leav ing the country. At a dramatic government hearing = on Qian's case, an official asked Qian: "In the event of conflict between= the United States and Communist China, would you fight for the United States?&q= uot; Qian, after a long pause, answered, "my essential allegiance is to the people of China. If a war were to start between the United States and China, and if the United States war aim was for the good of the Chinese people, an= d I think it will be, then, of course, I will fight on the side of the United States." [69]
Qian and hundreds of other Chinese scientists and engineers were eventua= lly allowed to return to China as a result of the Geneva Conference in 1955. The profound ambivalence in loyalty expressed by Qian continued, however, to ha= unt those who chose to remain in the U.S. To stay out of trouble, many in the Chinese American community, including scientists, adopted the strategy of striving for achievement in professional fields while shunning politics. [7= 0] After the purge of intellectuals during the Anti-Rightist campaign in China= in 1957, few Chinese scientists in the U.S. returned to their home country. [7= 1] Many, including C.N. Yang and T.D. Lee applied for and were granted U.S. citizenship. [72]
In the 1 960s, the civil rights and anti-Vietnam War movements stirred A= sian Americans to activism; they began to fight for their own rights in American society and culture. [73] The Asian American Movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s, according to one commentator, "made Asian Americans more American and less Asian." [74] Chinese American scientists did not pla= y a prominent role in the movement, although some joined the anti-war protests. [75] The emotional soul-searching that accompanied their decision to become U.S. citizens, however, led many of these scientists to discover the early, bitter history of Chinese Americans in the U.S. They began to identify with= the plights not only of early Chinese immigrants in the U.S., but also of contemporary Chinese American communities cloistered in the Chinatowns in m= ajor U.S. urban centers, previously a different world from that of Chinese Ameri= can professionals. [76] They often drew inspiration from examples of community solidarity provided by other ethnic gr oups, especially the African American civil rights struggle and the Jewish people's fight to remember the Holocau= st. [77] By all indications prominent members of the nascent Chinese American scientific community were becoming politically active and were waiting for a suitable venue to express their political opinions at the time of the U.S.-China rapprochement in the early 1970s.
The official reopening of this relationship provided Chinese American scientists with a golden opportunity both to satisfy their nationalistic impulse to help their homeland and to emerge from public obscurity in their adopted country. Along the way, they created a sense of their own distinct scientific community. Tu Weiming, the scholar of neo-Confucianism at Harvar= d, has noted that "The phenomenon of Chinese culture disintegrating at the center and later being revived from the periphery is a recurring theme in Chinese history." [78] For many overseas Chinese, as Tu explains, "the state, either Nationalist or Communist, controls the symbolic resources necessary for their cultural identity." [79] In this regard,= it was remarkable that few Chinese American scientists seemed to have exhibited much loyalty to Taiwan when they decided to travel to China despite explicit expressions of displeasure from the Nationalist government. Indeed, some scientists went to China in the face of anonymous threats attributed to pro-Taiwan forces. [80] For example, Chang-lin Tien, a professor of mechani= cal engineering at UC Berkeley and later chancellor of the campus in the 1990s,= was black-listed by Taiwan for several years because of his trips to China in 1= 973.
Among Chinese American scientists, the physicists C.N. Yang and T.D. Lee were the most active, and certainly the most visible, in the U.S .-China sc= ientific exchange. Each in his own way sought to revitalize Chinese science and soci= ety in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, whose destructiveness they, al= ong with most other visitors, learned of only after it was over in the late 197= 0s. Yang and Lee were representative of Chinese American scientists' home-count= ry nationalism. The most important contribution of his life, Yang said on Janu= ary 28, 1995, in Hong Kong, was "to help the Chinese change their percepti= on that the Chinese were not as talented as others." [81] Indeed, for Chi= nese all over the world, Yang and Lee represented the height of their ethnic pri= de ever since the announcement of their Nobel prize in 1957.
Despite their common goal of helping China, Yang and Lee held sharply different visions for the direction of Chinese science policy, which led th= em to give radically divergent advice to China's policymakers. [82] Generally speaking, Yang recognized the importance of basic research and was instrume= ntal in Zhou Enlai's and the Chinese scientists' drive to rehabilitate basic research in China, yet he thought that much more should be done in applied research. To him, applied research, in areas such as computers or biochemis= try, served as a link in the chain that would transform scientific ideas into technologies that would expedite national economic development. For this reason, he advised against an expensive high energy physics program in Chin= a. [83]
With memory of China's sufferings in the first half of the twentieth cen= tury in mind, Yang regarded poverty as the source of most of China's problems. "The most important thing for China," he said in 1986, was "= to advance its economy." He did not want China to engage in high energy physics because it had nothing to do with economic development; it "mi= ght even have negative effects, because it is too expensive." [84] The same concern for economic development also led Yang to give priority to stability over political reform, such as democratization and human rights, even in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989. "Let the economy = grow and later on reform," he told the New York Academy of Sciences' Commit= tee on the Human Rights of Scientists in 1996. "Eventually we will reach a more open, more democratic society," Yang said, "but we don't wan= t to go through the problems they had in the Soviet Union." [85]
Lee, on the other hand, advocated that China invest in basic research. He thought that China should develop its own high energy physics program, including building accelerators, as a way to keep Chinese scientists abreas= t of advances at the frontiers of science. In 1972, Lee expressed to Zhou Enlai = his skepticism toward the Maoist educational policy of sending high school graduates to work in the countryside for two or three years. He thought it = was a waste of time and was instrumental in changing that policy. [86] Lee also created, in 1980, the popular China-U.S. Physics Examination and Applicatio= ns (CUSPEA) program, which, until 1988, brought annually about one hundred top Chinese physics students each year for graduate study in the U.S. [87] His other projects included a continuing special class for science prodigies at= the University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, the establishment of = the Chinese Center for Advanced Science and Technology in Beijing, the initiati= on of a system of postdoctoral research in China, and, of course, the Beijing Electron-Positron Collider. [88]
Despite the divergence in their advice, the prominent role of the Chinese American scientists helped moderate the obvious concern in China about the political and cultural values that came with scientific exchange. The patriotic, nationalistic motive of these Chinese American scientists made t= he transmission of such values more acceptable. The identification of Chinese American scientists with Chinese culture also helped alleviate any affront = to national pride when they, rather than westerners who were not ethnically Chinese, promoted ideas that challenged Chinese orthodoxy. Their close pers= onal ties with Chinese leaders and their international prominence also enabled t= hem to speak out on sensitive issues without being censored; for similar actions Chinese scientists got in trouble. T.D. Lee, for example, told a group of Chinese graduate students in 1979 that he did not think that philosophy had= any impact on physics. [89] In 1986, C.N. Yang similarly dismissed this privile= ged branch of scholarship in China: "Physics influenced philosophy, but philosophy never influenced physics." [90] Such views, when advocated = by people like Fang Lizhi, the Chinese astrophysicist and dissident who wrote a book entitled Philosophy is a tool of physics, were officially denounced as attacks on Marxism's guiding role in Chinese science and society. [91] Both Lee's and Yang's speeches were officially published in China even after Fang was purged from the Communist Party for expressing the same views. [92]
The U.S.-China reopening gave Chinese American scientists a real sense of community for the first time. The widely dispersed Chinese American scienti= sts and scholars forged networks in the early 1970s, when they sought to organi= ze into groups to expedite their visits to China. They were invariably impress= ed by the social and material progress in the People's Republic and upon their return helped shape the American perception of the New China by giving publ= ic lectures and writing articles in the mass media. [93] For the first time in= the history of Chinese American scientists, they became a prominent voice in American public policymaking. [94] Since then, common interest in the development of Chinese science, technology, and education has continued to unite them. They urged the American government, for example, to loosen cont= rol of high-technology exports to China. [95]
Institutionally, Chinese American scientists, especially physicists, also began to organize themselves at the national and, later, international leve= ls. In 1977, Yang became the first president of the National Association of Chi= nese Americans, composed mostly of scientists and other professionals and design= ed to lobby for the normalization of the U.S.-China relationship. [96] The inf= lux of Chinese scientists and engineers who settled permanently in the U.S. aft= er the reopening of U.S.-China relations also infused the Chinese American scientific community with much vitality. According to one survey, there wer= e by the mid-1990s over 1,000 academics above the rank of university lecturers in the U.S. who came from mainland China. Among these, about 800 were in the s= ciences and engineering, 300 in social sciences and humanities, and 80 in other fie= lds. [97] Their entrance into the research community helped change the race and gender structure of American science: new Chinese American scientists and engineers incr eased the proportion of Asian Americans, and a significant percentage of the physicists, at least, were women. [98] While the Chinese government has been concerned with this obvious "brain drain," th= ese expatriates were not a complete loss for China, as many of them became entrepreneurs who have done much to promote U.S.-China trade and have contributed to the Chinese economic boom of the 1990s.
The loose connections among Chinese American scientists soon developed i= nto a transnational network of the Chinese diaspora, with potentially significa= nt political implications. In 1980, a conference on particle physics theories = in Guangzhou, China, drew together for the first time many ethnic Chinese physicists from around the world. [99] Later, Chinese American physicists organized an Overseas Chinese Physicists Association, including physicists = from mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, which sponsored sessions at American Physical Society meetings. [100] Most significantly, the First International Ethnic Chinese Physics Conference was held in Shantou, China, in 1995, just after the Chinese government conducted a series of menacing missile tests n= ear Taiwan as a warning against the independence movement on the island. The fa= ct that scientists from the official Academia Sinica of Taiwan came to the conference was viewed by many as an encouraging sign that scientists might = play a crucial role in the eventu al peaceful unification of China. [101]
Shih-shan Henry Tsai, a historian of China and Chinese Americans, has us= ed the term "subnationalism" to depict the activism of Chinese Ameri= cans who are occupied with and try to influence politics in their home country. [102] It is perhaps another case of the periphery, in the form of the overs= eas Chinese, saving the collapsing center. [103] In the case of the Chinese American scientists, this ethno-subnational scientific community has largely turned itself, under the guise of scientific internationalism, into the cor= e of an international network for both science and nationalism.
Post-Nixon exchange
Scientists became privileged politically in the Chinese society of the l= ate 1970s and 1980s, not only because of their role in the modernization drive,= but also, as Richard Suttmeier points out, because of their perceived importanc= e in China's international relations, especially with the U.S. [104] Such promin= ence gave scientists a measure of protection from politics and helped the format= ion of a nascent civil society, similar to the protection of Soviet physicists = by the Soviet bomb project, as described by David Holloway. [105]
The establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979 opened the way for a g= reat expansion in China-U.S. scientific exchanges, including the arrival of large numbers of Chinese students in the U.S. In May 1979, the two governments si= gned an agreement on collaboration in a wide range of topics in oceanography and fishery, including exchange of oceanographic data, joint research on the sedimentation process in the ocean, mariculture, oceanographic instruments,= marine environment, computer simulation, interaction between the ocean and the atmosphere, remote sensing in the sea, and fishery management. As a result,= the two nations exchanged dozens of delegations in various fields by 1984. One = of the most significant projects undertaken as part of this agreement was the study of sedimentation at the mouth of the Yangtze River. It lasted for four years, involving more than 100 Chinese and 30 American scientists and sever= al research vessels on both sides, apparently with good results. [106]
In the 1980s, while the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan helped to sustain= a strategic alliance between China and the U.S., a new motivation emerged in = the U.S. to continue and expand scientific exchanges with China. As China under Deng Xiaoping launched economic reform, the Reagan administration promoted contacts as a way both to encourage Chinese reform and to expand the potent= ial market for American products and technology. In testimony before a congressional task force on science policy in 1985, John P. McTague, deputy director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, illustrated the administration's emphasis on international cooperation in science: [107]
The example that I find most intriguing, and perhaps most pertinent to discussions here today, is the People's Republic of China. In spite of the fundamentally different philosophies of government that guide our two natio= ns, we have found a strong mutual bond in science and technology. Over the past= 10 years, that shared interest in both basic research and in how technology can speed industrial modernization has been the essential basis on which we have steadily narrowed the gap between countries and dramatically improved relations...As we have seen time and time again, probably the most effective channel we have found for nations to cooperate has been through science and technology. The example I cited earlier of the People's Republic of China m= ay be the most spectacular success.
In response to questioning from Congressmen, McTague stated that "by increasing technological capabilities in other countries, we then open up n= ew markets for ourselves and, I think, help stabilize the world situation.&quo= t; [108] He then went to explain why the U.S. was more liberal in its collabor= ation with China than with the Soviet Union:
The Soviet bloc has a clearly expansionist policy right now--Afghanistan= is an example--as opposed to the internal policies where it is clear that the People's Republic of China has decided to make a very major effort to utili= ze science and technology to modernize its nation, to increase its industrial base, to increase the standard of living for its people, to open its markets with the West. I don't see signs of similar things happening in the Soviet Union.
Impact of Tiananmen, 1989
In June 1989, the Chinese government's violent crackdown on the peaceful, student-led demonstration at Tiananmen Square in Beijing drew global condemnation. The United States and many other nations imposed diplomatic a= nd economic sanctions against China. The American scientific community interru= pted bilateral scientific and technological exchanges in protest against the violence. The National Academy of Sciences and several other American organizations suspended most of their joint projects with China in "outrage and sadness." The Royal Society in Britain and other European organizations followed suit. While these measures received general approval, more radical forms of protest threatened far-reaching curtailment= of scientific contact and therefore divided the scientific community in the We= st.
A subject of soul-searching debate, the dilemma facing many scientists w= as how to punish the Chinese government but avoid isolating their Chinese colleagues. On the one hand, proponents of radical measures, such as boycot= ting scientific exchange with China, argued that only an unambiguous public stand could help improve the situation of scientist-dissidents in China. They not only urged colleagues to boycott meetings in China, but also campaigned to prevent holding future conferences there until repression stopped. Business= as usual, as James C. Wang argued, was unconscionable: [109]
The stark contrast between the recent events in Eastern Europe and those= in China since [June 1989] argues strongly that all scientists should continue= to boycott activities in China. Any resemblance to normalcy in our interactions with our friends in China can only prolong the status quo and confirm the belief of those now in power that memory is short and history can be rewrit= ten overnight.
On the other hand, there were scientists who insisted that a boycott wou= ld interrupt the free flow of scientists and scientific ideas, push China back= to intellectual isolation, and hurt both Chinese science and scientists. As T.= D. Lee put it: [110]
The universality of science and the free exchange between scientists of = all nations has been a powerful force in helping to preserve civilization in difficult times. This is something I believe in deeply. Only through contin= uous contact with our colleagues in China can we help them in a genuine way.
Still others believed that quiet diplomacy was more effective than open sanctions. Sharp objections were also raised about the need to base actions= on the interests of working scientists in China and not on dissidents or exiled scientists.
The debate polarized the vast Chinese American scientific community; supporters of continuous contact with Chinese colleagues, such as Lee and Y= ang, were denounced as tools of Chinese propaganda. Nor could the institutions of American science, such as the National Academy of Sciences, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and the American Physical Socie= ty, agree on a concerted course of action.
By the early 1990s, as the political environment in China improved and interest in trade with China grew, scientific and technological exchanges resumed. Yet, with the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990= s, the strategic balance shifted and scientific exchange with China came under increased scrutiny by the U.S. government. In 1997, Peter Lee, a Taiwanese-= born Chinese American physicist who once worked at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, was arrested by the FBI for transmitting secret technology on lasers and detection of submarines to Chinese scientists. In a plea bargain, Lee admitted that he leaked classified information to the Chinese but insis= ted that it was unintentional--he was carried away by his enthusiasm for scient= ific exchange. In view of his cooperation and the fact that the information Lee leaked was soon declassified, Lee was given a very lenient sentence, one ye= ar in a half-way house. The event received scant media attention. [111]
In early 1999, the New York Times reported, based on leaked information = from the government, that Wen Ho Lee, another Taiwanese-born Chinese American scientist working at Los Alamos, was accused of transferring information on U.S. warhead design to China. It immediately became a prominent national political controversy. Lee was fired from his position for violation of security rules (not for spying) and, as of October 1999, was still not form= ally charged but under investigation by the FBI. In May 1999, a congressional committee under Rep. Christopher Cox (R-Calif.) issued a report that claimed that many Chinese students and scientists in the U.S. were engaged in spying for the Chinese government. [112] The spy cases and the Cox charges, true or not, had a chilling effect on international scientific communication and led some members of Congress to call for a moratorium on exchanges with foreign scientists. [113]
Conclusion
Despite these recent setbacks, U.S.-China scientific exchange has had profound impact on both countries and proved to be remarkably resilient. Geopolitics motivated the U.S. and China to sponsor scientific internationa= lism to accomplish essentially nationalistic goals. The U.S. aimed to counter So= viet expansion, as did China, but China also sought the exchange as a crucial pa= rt of its modernization drive. Yet, the scale of the exchange and enthusiasm of the participants cannot be explained only by the interest of the state. Traditional scientific internationalism played a crucial role in the exchan= ge, as historical connections between Chinese and American scientists from the 1930s and 1940s and especially the activism of Chinese American scientists = gave the exchange programs drive and momentum.
The home-country nationalism that motivated Chinese American scientists = to promote the U.S.-China scientific exchange, in the name of scientific internationalism, actually helped undermine the authority of the Chinese nation-state. Consciously or unconsciously, the extensive scientific and cultural exchanges they encouraged helped introduce liberal-democratic ideas and values into China, which challenged the orthodoxy of Marxist ideology. = The party and government could no longer control every step of the exchange process, nor could they keep an iron grip on whom to send, in terms of ideological correctness, where to send them, and what they would be exposed= to. The exchange promoted meritocracy and facilitated the creation of a public sphere as de-ideologization continued. Indeed, the clearest indications of = this democratic process were seen in the party's reaction to it: the drive again= st western "spiritual pollution" in 1982-1983 and then the anti-liberalization campaign in 1986-1987.
A comparison of the U.S.-China scientific exchange with that between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, which has been judged less successful, helps ill= uminate aspects of Cold War science. [114] Geopolitics played an important role in defining the characters of the two exchanges. There was much unease in the U.S.-Soviet exchange on both sides, probably because the contacts were to s= erve the purpose of defusing the danger of war. In contrast, the U.S.-China exch= ange was designed more to build an alliance. Also, the historical ties between senior members of the Chinese and U.S. scientific communities and the active role of Chinese American scientists--not to mention the traditional mission= ary spirit to change China toward an American model--gave the U.S.--China excha= nge an emotional appeal that was missing in the U.S.-Soviet case.
One can also compare the U.S.-China exchange with that between China and= the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Although China gained much industrial technology from the Soviets, the effect of the exchange on Chinese science and educati= on proved problematic. The imposition of the Soviet model of narrow, technical education broke up the structure of Chinese universities, which had been ba= sed largely on the American model of a liberal, general education. It also led = to the emergence of a generation of technocrats, who tended to ignore the human factors in big technology projects, such as the controversial Three Gorge D= am on the Yangtze river. Some of the Western-trained scientists also got into political trouble for disagreeing with the Soviet advisors. Then the decisi= on in the early 1960s of the Soviets to withdraw all advisors, with their blue= prints, created chaos and irrevocable damage in many technological projects. The arrogance and patronizing tone of some of the Soviet advisors toward senior Chinese scientists hurt national pride. Again, in the U.S.-China exchange, = the participation of Chinese American scientists significantly reduced difficul= ties in this respect, and the old ties from the 1930s and 1940s also helped prom= ote smooth communication and cooperation.
The U.S.-China scientific exchange benefited much from the intermixing e= ffect of Chinese American scientists as an international ethnic and scientific community, which helped blur national boundaries in science, even at the he= ight of the Cold War. International exchange, which was born of a geopolitical, nationalistic concern about an external threat, and encouraged further by t= he modernization drive, thus led to the relaxation of control by the nation-st= ate. Even in the post-Cold War era, U.S .-China scientific cooperation remains crucial in meeting major challenges to the world in areas such as environme= nt, energy, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. [115] In this endeavor, Chinese American scientists, as agents for transnational exchange, have pla= yed and will likely continue to play an important role. Yet, the spy cases remi= nd us that in many ways the domination of the nation-state in scientific communication will continue in the post-Cold War period.
(*.) Department of History, California State Polytechnic University, Pom= ona, CA 91768. I thank Richard Suttmeier, Lawrence Badash, H. Lyman Miller, Gene Rochlin, Wolfgang Panofsky, Xiaojian Zhao, Fan Dainian, Jim Williams, Peter Westwick, Jessica Wang, and Benjamin Zulueta for reading drafts of the paper and for stimulating discussions and comments. Translations from Chinese doc= uments are my own. Generally, names of Chinese in mainland China are rendered in pinyin with family names first and given names last. For Chinese Americans = and Chinese in Taiwan, names are usually spelled in the Wade-Giles style, with given names first and family names last: e.g., Chen Ning Yang, with the exception of Tu Wei-Ming, who uses Wade-Giles but places his family name fi= rst and given name second.
(1.) A. Doak Barnett, China and the major powers in East Asia (Washingto= n, D.C., 1977), 178, as quoted in Harry Harding, A fragile relationship: The United States and China since 1972 (Washington, D.C., 1992), 33; Leo A. Orleans, Science in China and U.S.-China scientific exchanges: Assessment a= nd prospects (Washington, D.C., 1976), 11, estimated in 1976 that about 10,000 Americans visited China between 1971 and 1976.
(2.) David M. Lampton, A relationship restored: Trends in U.S.-China educational exchanges, 1978-1984 (Washington, D.C., 1986); Leo A. Orleans, Chinese student's in America: Policies, issues, and numbers (Washington, D.= C., 1988). See also Kathlin Smith, "The role of scientists in normalizing U.S.-China relations, 1965-1979," and Richard P. Suttmeier, "Scientific cooperation and conflict management in U.S.-China relation= s, 1978 to the present," unpublished papers, 1998, courtesy of the author= s; Denis Fred Simon, "The role of science and technology in Chinese forei= gn relations," in Samuel S. Kim, ed., China and the world: Chinese foreign policy in the post-Mao era (Boulder and London, 1984), 293-318. There is al= so little written about U.S.-Taiwan scientific exchange, which should make a fascinating comparison with the U.S.-China case. Although it is beyond the scope of the present paper, I intend to address aspects of that story in the future.
(3.) Lawrence Badash, "British and American views of the German men= ace in World War I," Royal Society of London, Notes and records, 34 (1979), 91-121.
(4.) J.L. Heilbron, The dilemmas of an upright man: Max Planck as spokes= man for German science (Berkeley, 1986), 104.
(5.) Ibid., 109; Paul Forman, "Scientific internationalism and the Weimar physicists: The ideology and its manipulation in Germany after World= War I," Isis, 64 (1973), 151-180; Daniel Kevles, "'Into hostile polit= ical camps': The reorganization of international science in World War I," I= sis, 62 (1971), 47-60.
(6.) Peter Neushul and Zuoyue Wang, "Between the devil and the deep sea: C.K. Tseng, ocean farming, and the politics of science in modern China," unpublished paper.
(7.) In 1961, for example, the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) spent about $20 million overseas and planned to double it the next year. Eu= gene B. Skolnikoff to Jerome B. Wiesner, 13 Oct 1961 (National Archives, Office = of Science and Technology Records (RG 359), box 87, folder "International--T[itle] F[older] 1961"). On the Soviet imposition= of its state-dominated model in the East bloc, see Gabor Pallo, "Internationalism in Soviet world-science: The Hungarian case," in Elisabeth Crawford et al., eds., Denationalizing science (Dordrecht, 1993), 209-232.
(8.) Hu Jimin et al., eds., Wang Gangchang he tade kexue gongxian (Wang Ganchang and his scientific contributions) (Beijing, 1987).
(9.) Mikhail A. Klochko, Soviet scientist in Red China, trans. Andrew MacAndrew (New York, 1964).
(10.) The tortuous histories of the Geneva conference on Atoms for Peace= of 1955, the International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957-1958, and the 1958 Geneva Conference of Experts on a nuclear test ban illustrate the tension between international science and national security concerns. See Walter McDougall, The heavens and the earth: A political history of the space age = (New York, 1985), 118-121; Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik challenge (New York, 19= 93).
(11.) Robert F. Byrnes, Soviet-American academic exchanges, 1958-1975 (Bloomington, 1976); Glenn T. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the test ban (Berkeley, 1981), 201-203.
(12.) Walter Sullivan, Assault on the unknown: The International Geophys= ical Year (New York, 1961).
(13.) Yu Guangyuan, "Enshi he zhanyou" ("Beloved mentor a= nd comrade in arms") in Kexue jujiang, shibiao liufang (A great scientist= and teacher, a festschrift for Zhou Peiyuan on his 90th birthday) (Beijing, 199= 2), 80-86.
(14.) Gordon H. Chang, "JFK, China, and the bomb," Journal of American history, 74 (1988), 1287-1300.
(15.) Luis Alvarez to Claude T. Bissell, 9 Apr 1962 (National Archives, Office of Science and Technology Records (RG 359), box 141, folder "International--Title Folder 1962").
(16.) Walter G. Whitman to Harrison Brown, 10 May 1961 (National Archive= s, Office of Science and Technology Records (RG 359), box 87, folder "International-Chicom [Chinese Communists").
(17.) Neushul and Wang (ref. 6).
(18.) Henry Kissinger, White House years (Boston, 1982), 693,705; Harding (ref. 1), 35-36, 394-395.
(19.) Kissinger (ref. 18), 1490-1492, quote on 1492.
(20.) Another example of scientific internationalism paving the way for sensitive diplomatic overtures occurred in Chinese-Israeli relations. See "Israel will open liaison office in China," Los Angeles Times (11 June 1990), A7; Lena H. Sun, "China sets official ties with Israel,&qu= ot; Washington Post (25 Jan 1992), A14.
(21.) Memorandum of conversation between Kissinger, Zhou, and others, Beijing, 13 Nov 1973, in William Burr, ed., The Kissinger transcripts: The top-secret talks with Beijing and Moscow (New York, 1998), 204.
(22.) Zhou Enlai, "Jiancheng shehuizhuyi qiangguo, guanjian zaiyu shixian kexue jishu xiandaihua" ("To build a strong socialist nat= ion, the key is modernization in science and technology"), a talk at a conference on science and technology in Shanghai on 29 Jan 1963, Zhou Enlai xuanji (Selected papers of Zhou Enlai) (2 vols., Beijing, 1984), 2, 412-416= .
(23.) Zhou Enlai, "Zhuajin kexue jishu kaoca" ("Strengthen the study of [foreign] science and technology"), a talk with Chinese diplomats on 13 Feb 1966, Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan (Selected diplomatic papers of Zhou Enlai) (Beijing, 1990), 458-459.
(24.) Zhou Enlai, "Xiang sige xiandaihua de hongwei mubiao qianjin" ("March toward the grand goal of the four modernizations") excerpt from "Report on the work of the government" at the Fourth National People's Congress delivered on 13 J= an 1975, Zhou Enlai xuanji (ref. 22), 2, 412-416. The full report is reprinted= in Renmin Ribao (People's daily) (21 Jan 1975).
(25.) Although disappointed by these deletions, the American group was nevertheless delighted to hear Premier Zhou promise that China would consid= er sending some students to study in the U.S. See Glenn T. Seaborg, "China journal: Report of a visit to the People's Republic of China," 22 May-= 10 June 1973; unpublished manuscript courtesy of Professor Seaborg, 29-39; Smi= th (ref. 2).
(26.) Seaborg (ref. 25), 39.
(27.) See, for example, the following trip reports published by the CSCP= RC: Astronomy in China: A trip report of the American Astronomy Delegation (197= 9); Oceanography in China: A trip report of the American Oceanography Delegation (1980); Pure and applied mathematics in the People's Republic of China: A t= rip report of the American Pure and Applied Mathematics Delegation (1980); Solid state physics in the People's Republic of China: A trip report of the Ameri= can Solid State Physics Delegation (1976); Nuclear science in China (1980).
(28.) Anne Keatley, ed., Reflections on scholarly exchange with the Peop= le's Republic of China, 1972 -1976 (Washington, D.C., n.d.).
(29.) Richard Garwin, "China trip: Transcribed notes of a trip to t= he Chinese People's Republic, March 18 to April 17, 1974," 21 June 1974, = and Garwin, "Discussion at Chinese People's Institute for Foreign Affairs, December 10-12, 1979," 17 Dec 1979, unpublished manuscripts courtesy of Dr. Garwin; Laya Wiesner, "China notes: Jerome and Laya Wiesner's visi= t to People's Republic of China, October 1974" (Committee on Scholarly Communication with China Archives, George Washington University Library, Washington, D.C.).
(30.) Yao Shuping, Luo Wei, Li Peishan, and Zhang Wei, Zhongguo kexueyuan (Chinese Academy of Sciences), Vol. 1(3 vols., Beijing, 1994); Zuoyue Wang, "Revolutionary utilitarianism: Science and political ideology in China, 1949-1976," a paper presented at the workshop on "Science and political ideology," Union College, Schenectady, NY, Aug 1997.
(31.) Only in November 1972 did the State Council approve a report of the Chinese Academy of Sciences that allowed the exchange of scientific books a= nd journals with foreign countries. See Wu Heng, Keji zhanxian wushinian (Fifty years on the scientific and technological front) (Beijing, 1992), 362. Wu w= as a long-time science administrator in the Chinese Communist Party. One reason = Zhou said that China needed to do some preparation before receiving foreign scientists was that during the Cultural Revolution most research had stoppe= d, so there was not much to show. See Zhu Kezhen, Zhu Kezhen riji (Zhu Kezhen diary), Vol. 5 (5 vols., Beijing, 1990), 553, entry for 14 Sep 1972.
(32.) Wu (ref. 31), 353-354.
(33.) Ibid., 346-356.
(34.) Neushul and Wang (ref. 6).
(35.) Seaborg (ref. 25), 39.
(36.) Glenn T. Seaborg, "China revisited: May 14 - June 11, 1978,&q= uot; report prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy, courtesy of Professor Seaborg; interview with Seaborg by Zuoyue Wang, 3 Mar 1992, Berkeley.
(37.) Wu (ref. 31), 361. In 1975, a scientific delegation visited the U.= S. under the leadership of Zhou Peiyuan and the marine biologist Zeng Chengkui (C.K. Tseng), including a warm reception with President Gerald Ford in the White House. Upon their return, however, delegation members found that poli= tics had removed their original sponsors from power and they themselves became target of attacks. See Neushul and Wang (ref. 6).
(38.) Wang (ref. 30); Richard Suttmeier, Research and revolution: Science policy and societal change in China (Lexington, MA, 1974).
(39.) Zhu (ref. 31), entries for 6-14 Jan 1970.
(40.) Wu (ref. 31), 363.
(41.) Zhu (ref. 31), entries for 6-14 Jan 1970.
(42.) Long conferences were common in China, probably due both to inefficiency and to the substantial time devoted to political and ideologic= al studies.
(43.) Wu (ref. 31), 347-349.
(44.) Ibid., 349-352.
(45.) Ibid., 351; Chen Ning Yang, Selected papers, with commentary (San Francisco, 1983), 76-77.
(46.) Yang (ref. 45), 77-78.
(47.) Zhou Peiyuan, '"Sirenbang' pohuai jichu lilun yanjiu yongxin hezai" ("Why did the 'Gang of Four' sabotage basic theoretical research"), Renmin Ribao (People's daily) (13 Jan 1977), reprinted in Chedi jianfa pipan "sirenbang" cuanda duoquan de taotian zuixing (Thoroughly disclose and criticize the great crimes of the "Gang of Four" w ho wanted to seize the power of the party) (Beijing, 1977). Zh= ou Ruling, "Fuqin" ("Father"), Kexue jujiang, shibiao liuf= ang (A great scientist and teacher a festschrfit for Zhou Peiyuan on his 90th birthday), 274-307, on 284; Chi-Kung Jen, Recollections of a Chinese physic= ist (New York, 1991); Yang (ref. 45), 77-78.
(48.) Zhou Enlai to Zhou Peiyuan, 23 Jul 1972, quoted in Wu (ref. 31), 3= 64.
(49.) For Mao's interest in high energy physics, see Mao Zedong, "Guanyu Bantian wenzhang de tanhua" ("A talk on the articles= of Shoichi Sakata"), 24 Aug 1964, Mao Zedong Sixiang Wansui (Long live Mao Zedong thoughts) (n.p., n.d.), 561-567.
(50.) Yao et at. (ref. 30), 386.
(51.) The group was called the first division of the 401 Institute of the Second Ministry of Machinery. See Zhou Enlai xuanji (ref. 22), 2, 535, n368= . On August 18, 1972, the group wrote a letter to Zhou Enlai describing the stat= us of high energy physics in China and proposing that China promote research i= n that field. Ibid., 534, n366.
(52.) Although Zhang was apparently not involved in nuclear weapons research, his wife, Wang Chengshu, a Ph.D. from the University of Michigan,= was in charge of the diffusion process to enrich uranium for the bomb. See Peng Jichao, Dongfang jiuxiang: Zhongguo hewuqi shiyan jishi (China's nuclear we= apon tests) (Beijing, 1995), 52-55, 146-150.
(53.) The Chinese (Nationalist) government sent Zhu Guangya and T.D. Lee= to the U.S. in 1946 with the hope that they would study nuclear physics and re= turn to build atomic bombs for China. See Qiu Zhaoming, "Li Zhengdao" ("T.D. Lee"), Lu Jiaxi, editor in chief, Zhongguo xiandai kexuejia zhuanji (Biographies of modern Chinese scientists) (Beijing, 1994), 153-178= , on 154; "Zhu Guangya Li Zhengdao chuan ceng lal mei xue zao yuanzidan&quo= t; ("Zhu Guangya and T.D. Lee reportedly came to the U.S. to learn how to make atomic bombs,") Shijie Ribao (World Journal) (7 June 1998), A9. <= /p>
(54.) Zhou Enlai, "Zhongshi jichu kexue he lilun yanjiu" ("Take basic science and theoretical research seriously"), a lett= er to Zhang Wenyu and Zhu Guangya on 21 Sep 1972, in Zhou Enlai xuanji (ref. 2= 2), 2, 473.
(55.) Wu (ref. 31), 369-370.
(56.) Ibid., 370.
(57.) Ibid., 368-369.
(58.) Ibid., 368.
(59.) Ibid., 368-369; Zhou also relied on Lee to certify discoveries mad= e by Chinese physicists. At a meeting, Zhang Wenyu asked Zhou whether Chinese scientists should publish the discovery of a new particle and Zhou said tha= t he would need to discuss it with Lee first. See Zhu (ref. 31), 558-559, entry = for 5 Oct 1972.
(60.) Wu (ref. 31), 370-371; interview with Panofsky by Zuoyue Wang, Jan 1998, Berkeley. According to Ye Minghan, long-time Vice Director of the Institute for High Energy Physics, Zhang initially proposed a machine in the 20-30 GeV range, but C.C. Ting, the third Chinese American physicist to win= the Nobel prize, persuaded the Chinese scientists and government that to make n= ew discoveries they needed 40-50 GeV. C.N. Yang recommended that instead of building the accelerator by itself, China should purchase a small one from abroad. Fan Dainian emails to Zuoyue Wang, 14 and 20 Mar 1998.
(61.) The enterprise was dubbed "Project 753," in honor of the month. Wu (ref. 31), 371.
(62.) Ibid., 372.
(63.) Yao et al. (ref. 30), 414-415. On Hua's program, see Roderick MacFarquhar, "The succession to Mao and the end of Maoism, 1969-82,&qu= ot; MacFarquhar, ed., The politics of China: The eras of Mao and Deng (New York, 1997), 248-339, esp. 316-317.
(64.) Yao et al. (ref. 30), 414-415. Even before this decision, SLAC had maintained extensive exchange and cooperation with Chinese high energy physicists. See Wolfgang Panofsky to Ingrid H. Hoffmann, l2 Apr 1986, and attached draft article by Ingrid Hoffmann on U.S.-China cooperation in high energy physics (Committee on Scholarly Communication with China archives, George Washington University Library, Washington, D.C.); Panofsky interview (ref. 60); Liu Huaizu, Beijing zhengfu dianzi duizhuangji (Beijing electron= positron collider) (Beijing, 1994), 36-45.
(65.) Yao et al. (ref. 30), 415-418; Liu (ref. 64).
(66.) Chinese leaders, especially Zhou Enlai, adroitly tapped into the home-country nationalism of Chinese Americans. During a meeting with C.S. Wu and her physicist husband, Luke Yuan, Zhou showed his deeply moved guests a= map indicating how much Chinese territory formerly under Russian control he was able to get back from the Soviet Union through negotiations in the 1950s. S= ee Ts'ai-chien Chiang, Wu Chien-hsiung: wu li k'o hsueh ti ti i fu jen (C.S. W= u: The first lady of physical science) (T'ai-pei, 1996).
(67.) Yang (ref. 45), 57.
(68.) Iris Chang, Thread of the silkworm (New York, 1995), 143.
(69.) Ibid., 170.
(70.) Ibid., 196-198.
(71.) Li Peishan, "Science and technology: U.S. impact on China,&qu= ot; Beijing review, 34 (18 Nov 1991), 35-37.
(72.) Yang (ref. 45), 56-57.
(73.) William Wei, The Asian American movement (Philadelphia, 1993).
(74.) Shih-Shan Henry Tsai, review of The Asian American movement by Wil= liam Wei, Pacific historical review, 64 (1995), 154-155.
(75.) Chi-Kung Jen, Recollections of a Chinese physicist (Los Alamos, 19= 91).
(76.) Yang (ref. 45), 56-57. Yang, "My reflections on some social problems," a speech delivered to the Hong Kong Student Association in = New York on 3 Oct 1970, Yang, Dushu jiaoxue sishi nian (Forty years of studying= and teaching) (Hong Kong, 1985), 55-61.
(77.) Yang, "My reflections" (ref. 76); Ruan Beikang and Ouyang Yingzi, "Zhongmei de huagong yanjiu he yingyong: Fang Wei Qianguang jiaoshou" ("Research and applications of chemical engineering in China and the United States: An interview with Professor James Wei" on= 21 Aug 1978), Ruan and Ouyang, Xueren Zhuanfang Lu (Interviews with scholars) (Hong Kong, 1980), 124.
(78.) Tu Wei-ming, "Cultural China: The periphery as center," Daedalus, 120 (Spring 1991), 1-32, quote on 12.
(79.) Ibid., 16.
(80.) Jen (ref. 75); interview with Chang-lin Tien by Zuoyue Wang, 19 Mar 1999, Berkeley. Elizabeth Venant, "A position of prominence," Los Angeles times (27 Aug 1990), E1-3, on E3 In a way, Tien represented the sec= ond generation of Chinese American scientists, who usually grew up in mainland China, fled with their families to Taiwan in the 1940s, then came to study = in the U.S. in the 1950s and 1960s. I intend to study their experiences in a future project.
(81.) C.N. Yang, Dushu jiaoxue zhai shinian (Ten more years of learning = and teaching) (Taipei, 1995), back cover.
(82.) The difference perhaps reflected in some ways the well-known perso= nal animosity between the two early collaborators. See, for example, T.D. Lee, "Broken parity," T.D. Lee selected papers, G. Feinberg, ed. (3 vo= ls., Boston, 1986), vol. 3, 487-509.
(83.) Zhu (ref. 31), 544, entry for 4 Aug 1972.
(84.) C.N. Yang, "Tantan wulixue yanjiu he jiaoxue: zai beijing zhongguo kexue jishu daxue yanjiushengyuan de wuci tanhua" ("On research and teaching in physics: Five talks at the Graduate School of the University of Science and Technology of China in Beijing," 27 May-12 J= une 1986), Yang Zhenning Yanjiang Ji (Speeches of Chen Ning Yang) (Tianjin, Chi= na, 1989), 145-160, on 149.
(85.) Burkhard Bilger, "Holding pattern: Chinese science has arrive= d, but the fate of dissident scientists is still up in the air," Sciences, 36:4 (Jul-Aug 1996), 10-11.
(86.) Zhou responded that the reason was not ideological but material: t= he government could not accommodate all the students in universities. But he agreed that some of the more talented ones should be allowed to enter university directly. See Zhou Enlai, "Zhongxue biyesheng keyi zhijie s= hang daxue" ("Middle school students can go directly to university&quo= t;), Zhou Enlai xuanji (ref. 22), 2, 473-474.
(87.) William Sweet, "Future of Chinese students in US at issue; CU= SPEA program nears its end," Physics today, 41 (June 1988), 67-71; Robert Novick, ed., Thirty years since parity nonconservation: A symposium for T.D. Lee (Boston, 1988), 169.
(88.) See T.D. Lee, Li Zhengdao wenji (Essays of Lee Tsung-Dao) (Hangzho= u, China, 1999). T.D. Lee founded the Center (Zhongguo Gaodeng Kexue Jishu Zhongxin) in 1986, with funding from the Italian government. It sponsored colloquia, workshops, and other activities where Chinese scientists could m= eet and talk to visiting foreign or overseas Chinese scientists. See articles a= bout or by Lee in Zuji (Footprints: C.N. Yang's, TD. Lee's, Samuel Ting's, and Y= uan T. Lee's routes to successes) (Beijing, 1989), 95-166.
(89.) T.D. Lee, "Wulixue ji qita" ("Physics and beyond"), a talk with graduate students at the graduate school of the University of Science and Technology of China, Beijing," 12 May 1979, = in Zuji (ref. 88), 98-102, on 101.
(90.) Yang (ref. 84).
(91.) See Fang Lizhi, Bringing down the Great Wall: Writings on science, culture, and democracy in China, ed. James H. Williams (New York, 1991); H. Lyman Miller, Science and dissent in Post-Mao China: The politics of knowle= dge (Seattle, 1996).
(92.) Yang also criticized the Chinese emphasis on collective research in favor of more individual choices. Chen Ning Yang, "Fahui qiaoliang zuoyong, cujin zhongguo faxhan" ("Playing the role of a bridge, a= nd promoting Chinese development"),Ning Zhiping, Tang Xianmin, and Zhang Qinhua, eds., Yang Zhenning Yanjiangji (Collected speeches by Chen Ning Yan= g), 195-197.
(93.) Qishi Niandai (The seventies journal), Liumei huayi xuezhe chongfa zhongguo guangan ji (Reflections on revisiting China by Chinese American scholars) (Hong Kong, 1974).
(94.) See, for example, Edward David, Jr. to Henry Kissinger, 22 Sep 197= 1, on "Visit of U.S. physicist, C.N. Yang, to the People's Republic of China" (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Subject Files, FG 6-9, box 1, folder "[EX] FG 6-9 Offic= e of Science and Technology 1/1/71-"). David was Nixon's science advisor at= the time.
(95.) Yang (ref. 92), 197.
(96.) Nie Huatong, "Wo suo zhidao de Yang Zhenning" ("The Chen Ning Yang that I know"), reprinted in Pan Guoju and Han Chuanyuan, eds., Ning zhuo wu qiao: Yang Zhenningfangtai lu (Interviews with C.N. Yang) (Singapore, 1988), 101-119.
(97.) Wang Xi, "Dalu lumei xueren ziyuan yu ershiyi shiji zhongguo = de fazhan" ("Mainland scholarly personnel in the United States and China's development in the twenty-first century"), Shijie Ribao (Chine= se daily) (9 Nov 1997), A5.
(98.) According to a survey conducted by the American Institute of Physi= cs in 1996, women make up 12% among the 144 Asian or Pacific Islander U.S. Ph.= D. physicists, but only 6% of the 1,942 U.S. Ph.D. physicists of all other eth= nic groups. Email from Raymond Chu of AIP to Zuoyue Wang, 5 Mar 1998.
(99.) Yang (ref. 76), 89.
(100.) Tung-Mow Yan, "Professor C.N. Yang's impact on physics," C.S. Liu and S.-T. Yau, eds., Chen Ning Yang, A great physicist of the twentieth century (Boston, 1995), 451-456.
(101.) Ted Plafker, "Physics meeting unites the two Chinas--briefly," Science, 269 (18 Aug 1995), 916.
(102.) Shih-shan Henry Tsai, The Chinese experience in America (Blooming= ton, 1986).
(103.) Tu (ref. 78).
(104.) Richard Suttmeier, Science, technology, and China's drive for modernization (Stanford, 1980), 67-94.
(105.) David Holloway, Stalin and the bomb: The Soviet Union and atomic energy, 1939-56 (New Haven, 1994). On Chinese scientists' evolution toward political dissent, see Miller (ref. 91).
(106.) Luo Yuru, Zeng Chengkui, and C.K. Tseng, eds., Dangdai Zhongguo de haiyang shiyan (Oceanography in Contemporary China) (Beijing, 1985), 416-41= 8.
(107.) Testimony of John P. McTague, 20 June 1985, International coopera= tion in science, Task Force on Science Policy Committee on Science and Technolog= y, House of Representatives, 99th Congress, 1st session, Hearings, 7 (Washingt= on, D.C., 1985), 235-236.
(108.) Ibid., 249.
(109.) James C. Wang, "
(110.) T.D. Lee, "U.S.-China relations," letter to the editor, Science, 246(17 Nov 1989), 873.
(111.) See Eric Lichtblau, "Physicist admits passing laser secrets =
to
Chinese scientists," Los Angeles Times (9 Dec 1997), B1. A group of
Chinese scientists who hosted Lee have denied that Lee passed any military
secrets. The open letter by Wang Ganchang et al. is published in Renmin Rib=
ao
(People s Daily), overseas edition (11 Feb 1998), 4. See also Rone Tempest,
"Chinese scientists defend southland spy," Los Angeles Times (11 =
Feb
1998), A4; James Brook, "An earlier
(112.) U.S. national security and military/commercial concerns with the People's Republic of China (the "Cox Report"), U.S. House of Representatives, 106th Congress, 1st session (Washington, DC, 1999). The fu= ll text is available on the U.S. House of Representatives website: http://www.house.gov/conxreport/.
(113.) James Brooke, "Senator tells nuclear bomb labs to end foreign scientists' visits," New York Times (13 Apr 1999), A14.
(114.) Linda L. Lubrano, "National and international politics in U.S.-U.S.S.R. scientific cooperation," Social sudies of science, 11(19= 81), 451-480; Byrnes (ref. 11).
(115.) See, for example, U.S. National Academy of Scie=
nces
Panel on Global Climate Change Sciences in