CHAPTER IV
POST-CIVIL WAR POLITICS,
1865-1867
The Problems of Reconstruction
Shortly after assuming office in April 1865, President
Andrew Johnson began his own reconstruction policy instead of waiting to consult
with Congress when it reconvened in December. Johnson’s terms for allowing
the Southern states to return to the Union were lenient. He asked that the
Southern states accept the abolition of slavery, disavow secession, and cancel
the debts incurred in aid of the Confederate cause; these requirements left such
questions as education for blacks, social relationships, and civil and political
rights to the individual states. By the end of May he had recognized
Virginia’s government and outlined a plan for restoring North Carolina.
During the next six weeks, the President appointed governors for the states of
Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas, and all
turned to the task of establishing governments. Meanwhile, Johnson pardoned
numerous Confederates who, understandably enough, took advantage of his
generosity to restore as much local control as possible. Encouraged by
Johnson’s permissive attitude, the politicians who dominated the Johnson
governments instituted the Black Codes, a series of laws designed to keep
African Americans in a state of economic subordination without education or
civil and political rights.
[1]
When Congress convened in December, the Radical and
moderate Republicans united to prevent the seating of senators and
representatives from the former Confederate states. The following February,
Congress agreed that no Congressmen from the Southern states could be seated in
either house until Congress had declared that the state in question qualified
for representation. In addition to revulsion at the South’s treatment of
the freedmen, the members of Congress feared what Southern states might do when
they gained the approximately fifteen additional representatives to which they
would become entitled upon reapportionment after the 1870
Census.
[2]
The status of the Southern states caused conflict
between Congress and the President, but the primary issue was the position of
free blacks in American society. Despite the defeat of the South, simply freeing
African Americans failed to give them either real freedom or equality. Because
the Radical Republicans championed the black cause, their opponents accused them
of attempting to secure the black vote for the Republican Party. The obvious
risk of losing Northern white votes points to other motives for what might
almost be termed a suicidal political policy. In 1865, for example, Connecticut
voters turned down a statute allowing blacks to vote; in 1866 voters in
Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Colorado defeated similar measures. Owing to their
feelings about African Americans, white men in the North and the South held many
doubts about blacks’ ability to join the American electorate. The small
group of Radical Republicans who struggled to obtain political and civil rights
for blacks based their efforts on the same commitment and the kind of idealism
that had fired the abolitionists. They argued that if all men are equal in the
eyes of God, then it was morally wrong to deny African Americans the rights that
white men enjoyed. From these beliefs, and in the face of considerable
resistance from the state governments and the American people, came the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
[3]
The
Political Situation in CaliforniaThe people and politicians
of California joined the national debate on Reconstruction and the status of the
freedmen. Since 1858 and the Kansas-Lecompton question, Californians had been
deeply involved in national events; for the next few years, newspapers,
political speeches, party platforms, legislative resolutions, and
governors’ messages all indicated concern over the vital issues facing the
country. The Civil War changed the pattern of Democratic domination in
California, and that party’s hold on the state dwindled. Throughout the
Civil War, some California Democrats refused to join the Republicans in the
Union Party; this group fused with the Breckinridge or Peace Democrats in 1863
and together they tentatively launched the reconstructed Democratic Party. The
old pro-South group from ante-bellum days, with their taint of treason,
dominated the newborn Democrats, just as the Republicans had been the major
force in the Union Party. But in the Union Party’s disparate membership
and its influential Douglas Democrats, an astute Democrat could see hopes for
his party’s eventual triumph at the
polls.
[4]
The Union Party contained a wide range of political
opinions. There were pro-slavery Whigs and Democrats, anti-slavery and
anti-secession Democrats, and moderate and Radical Republicans—all united
by a desire to save the Union. The largest elements in the party were the
Republicans and the Douglas (anti-secession) Democrats. Shortly after the end of
the war, the Union Party divided over the issues of Reconstruction just as
Congress and President Johnson did. Although the split was not exactly according
to the old party lines, the majority of those men who had been Republicans and
anti-slavery before the war remained Republicans after the war. Men with doubts
about abolition and black suffrage joined the reorganized Democracy, or
“the Democracy without slavery but with every desire to hinder and thwart
the administration in its efforts at reconstruction of the
Union.”
[5]
As early as June 1865, the
San Francisco Daily Examiner predicted
that the Union Party had “run its course.” The paper
said:
Its elements were, at best, an incongruous mixture. Old
line Whigs, piebald ‘Native Americans,’--cast offs from the
Democratic party, and men who were Democrats only to share the official
plunder—Abolitionists, Free Lovers, and the rag-tag and bobtail of the
entire fanatical tribe of New England made up the aggregate of that mass styled
Republicans, who upon a specious hobby [African Americans], rode triumphantly
into office.
Nevertheless, in September 1863, Unionist
Frederick F. Low had won a four-year term
for governor with 64, 283 votes
to Democrat John Downey’s 44,622 votes. The Democratic platform denounced
Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation and objected to the
government’s “open and avowed disregard of state rights,” but
Californians were not yet ready to swing whole-heartedly to the Democrats. In
1864 they re-elected Lincoln by giving him 62,000 votes as opposed to 44,000 for
George B. McClellan, and sent three Union Congressmen to
Washington.
[6]
In his first biennial message of December 4, 1865, Low
recommended to the legislature passage of the Thirteenth Amendment. Congress
passed the amendment and sent it to the state legislatures on January 31, 1865;
ratification was completed in December 1865. Sixty-six members of the
California Assembly approved the amendment on December 7, 1865, but eleven
members voted against the measure. On December 15, 1865, the full Senate voted
for it with 34 affirmative votes to four no votes. In the same message, Low
reviewed President Johnson’s reconstruction policies, saying:
If the reports from some of these [Southern] states is
true, that they have elected bitter and unrelenting enemies of the Government to
some of the highest offices of trust and power— . . . it would seem that a
season of probation, under a just and humane military rule, would be likely to
improve the quality of loyalty existing in those districts.
Low also suggested that if the Southern states wanted
to hasten their return to the Union, they could use the votes of blacks, which
“if added to the present loyal minority, would establish those states on a
firm foundation” Twelve years later, Low told historian Hubert Howe
Bancroft, “We gave the negroes in the South the rights of citizenship
simply to protect them. There was no other way, as was thought by the
wise.”
[7]
The
Union Party SplitIronically enough, Governor Low became one
of the immediate causes of the split in the Union Party. For many years in
California a few professional politicians had named the candidates for all
offices. The Union Party inherited this custom from the Democrats and used it
during their years of dominance. California’s primary system favored
“bossism” by making it possible for an ambitious politician to
secure the nomination of his choice “by the use of money and by voting the
same men several times over.” Such a politician was United States Senator
John Conness, a former Douglas Democrat, who had succeeded in having Low
nominated and elected governor in place of Leland Stanford. In 1865 he planned
to have Low elected United States senator to replace Douglas Democrat James A.
McDougall, whose term would expire on March 3, 1867. With this aim in mind,
Conness supporters in the legislature of 1863-64 introduced a bill to
gerrymander San Francisco to insure the election of Conness men to the
legislature of 1865-66, which would elect a new senator. His political opponents
accused Conness of giving control of San Francisco to the “boys,” or
“Short-hairs,” former Democrats, who now that the Union was saved,
“eagerly returned to the pursuit of politics as a trade.”
Union-Republicans who opposed Conness were called “Long-hairs,” and
were led by John Bidwell and Cornelius
Cole.
[8]
Although Low had been an active Republican since 1861,
considerable opposition to his candidacy, and especially to his sponsor,
developed. In some counties both Long-hairs and Short-hairs bolted conventions
that nominated opposition candidates. The
Sacramento Daily Union
commented:
In every county of the state where regular nominations
have been made by Union Conventions, and the nominees have been anti-Low, the
friends of that senatorial aspirant, when they have bolted, have sought
affiliation with copperheads, and thus endeavored to destroy the integrity of
the Union organization, and give aid and comfort to the enemy.
In August 1865, Low withdrew from the senatorial
contest, saying that charges that he had caused the Union Party split prompted
his decision. Former congressman Cornelius Cole replaced him as Republican
candidate for the U.S. Senate and served from March 1867 to March 1873.
Low’s withdrawal failed to reunite the party, however, because there was
another even more divisive issue splitting the
Unionists.
[9]
The
Election of 1865
African American suffrage was the principal
issue in the 1865 California election. The Long-hairs and the Short-hairs
disagreed on this important subject. The Short-hairs opposed extending the vote
to blacks and their views corresponded with those of the Democrats whose firmest
plank was:
That upon every ground of justice and policy to the
white people of the country, as well as humanity to the negroes themselves, the
democratic party is inflexibly opposed to negro suffrage, and its inevitable
conse- quence: the political and social equality of the negro in every form, . .
.
Democrats also opposed what they called “The
unnatural and revolutionary scheme for thrusting universal suffrage, by action
of congress, upon the negroes of the southern
states.”
[10]
Much to the disgust of the
San Francisco Elevator, the Long-hairs
of the Union Party tried to avoid taking a stand on black suffrage, and the
party’s platform omitted the subject. “Not a word is uttered in
reference to negro suffrage, the great political problem of the day,” the
newspaper said, “on the solution of which depends the stability of
reconstruction, and perhaps, permanency of the Union.” The Union Party
convention’s choice of Silas W. Sanderson, whom the
Elevator called “a known and
avowed secessionist,” for supreme court justice, prompted the paper to
say, “The Union party of this State has completely stultified itself-- . .
.” In a statement reflecting the party’s attitude, the Butte County
Union convention said: “. . . the question of ‘negro
suffrage,’. . . is one which belongs in the non-seceding states,
exclusively to the states themselves, and as yet in this state is not an issue
to be presented to the people for their action.”
Despite the obvious
reluctance of the party on this issue, the Democrats loudly accused the
Unionists of being favorable to black suffrage. “Quiet as they keep on the
question,” the
Examiner wrote,
“it is the secret determination of the Black Republican party to elevate
the negro to the status of the poor white man, and to enact such naturalization
laws as will limit the extension of our Irish voting population.”
Furthermore, the newspaper charged, “the Abolition party [knows] that a
mortal antipathy exists between the white-skinned, pure blooded Hibernian, and
the sooty sons of Afric’s burning clime.” The paper asserted that
the Irish were Democrats “almost to a man” and that the Republicans
“would be willing to invest the monkey tribe with the rights of freemen,
if, . . . they could be certain of obtaining political strength to overcome the
Irish Democratic vote of the country.” Attempting to rebut Democratic
charges, the
Stockton Independent
insisted, “There is not a corporal’s guard of the Union party of
this State in favor of negro suffrage, and not a white man in all the state in
favor of ‘social equality’ with that
race.”
[11]
On July 15, 1865, however, John Conness had told a
Placerville audience, “There are a great many of our people, and very good
people, too, who think the vote of a loyal black man carries in it and with it
more security than the vote of a white rebel. I think they are right.” But
just a month later, fellow Union-Republican Frank Pixley took another tack in a
speech before the Mechanics’ Institute in San Francisco. While willing to
see African Americans’ labor, freedom, family ties, and education
protected, Pixley drew the line at social equality. Pixley said he thought the
white race was superior: “. . . but whether it is or not, because it is
mine, I would have it contain all the political power; I would not invest the
negro with the privilege of the elective franchise. I would not . . . enable him
to hold office or in any way to seek to establish with him relations of social
equality.
Earlier in the year the
Elevator had called social equality
“a bug-bear, a hideous phantom raised . . . to frighten the people from
their duty.” “We shall strive for ‘Equality before the
law,’” the paper asserted, “and let our social relations
arrange themselves.”
[12]
The cooperation of the Union Short-hairs with the
Democrats in opposing black suffrage indicated trouble for the divided
Union-Republicans. And in 1865 the Democrats scored some immediate gains in
their climb back to political power. Although the Union Long-hairs remained in
control of both houses of the legislature, the fusionists took Sacramento,
Amador, Yolo, Sonoma, and Stanislaus counties and achieved some success in San
Francisco. Plumas, Colusa, Mendocino, Siskiyou, Los Angeles, and San Diego
counties also elected Democrats to the legislature. Equally encouraging to the
Democrats, and more significant, was the permanence of the Union rift, a rift
that became more pronounced with
time.
[13]
California
and Congressional ReconstructionAlthough the Democrats were a
minority in the legislature of 1865-66, they were not a silent minority. They
expressed their views on universal suffrage, social equality, reconstruction,
and other issues in a series of resolutions presented to the legislature. The
Unionists tabled most of these resolutions or sent them to the Committee on
Federal Relations; the volume became so heavy that on December 19, 1867, the
Assembly adopted a resolution referring
all motions and resolutions on
reconstruction and suffrage to the Committee on Federal Relations. In the
meantime, the Democrats continued to express their party’s philosophy and
stands. In contrast, the Union Party spokesmen sounded more cautious about the
important issues of the day, perhaps because their national leaders also found
themselves in a tentative period. But soon after the legislature convened, a
number of Democratic legislators introduced resolutions in their respective
houses. Democratic Senator George Pearce’s resolution praised President
Johnson’s efforts to restore Southern “social relations and
governments”; Assemblyman William Holden, who had voted against the
Thirteenth Amendment, asked among other things, that California’s
Congressmen be requested to oppose and vote against any measure that would
confer suffrage on blacks in the District of Columbia. Also in the Assembly,
Samuel L. Lupton resolved “That we heartily endorse the pardoning power
conferred upon the chief executive of the United States as exercised by
President Andrew Johnson toward the erring people of the southern states.”
Senator John S. Hager’s resolution stated, “That we endorse and
concur in the views entertained by the president, . . . that under the federal
constitution all questions relating to an extension of the elective franchise to
the freedmen of the south should be referred to the several states and
determined and regulated exclusively by them-- . . .
[14]
In January 1866 the
Sacramento Daily Union, a self-styled
independent newspaper, explained that the universal suffrage question was
“the material issue” between President Johnson and the Congress. The
Radical Republicans were just entering a period of extended battle with the
President that ended with their triumph at the polls in the fall of 1866 and the
attempted impeachment in the spring of 1868. The pressing question was still how
best to protect the freedmen in the South. The Radical Republicans believed
suffrage was the answer, but bringing the North to this view would not be easy.
At this time, the
Union favored a
constitutional amendment that used the whole population of a state as the basis
for representation—in states where men were excluded from voting on the
basis of color they would not be counted for representation
purposes.
[15]
Another cause of contention between Johnson and the
Republicans was the Freedmen’s Bureau. In March 1865, Congress created the
bureau to protect Southern blacks and to help organize the Southern labor
market. The bureau, “an attempt to establish a government guardianship
over the negroes and assure their economic and civil rights,” also
provided relief to destitute Southern whites. In February 1866, the President
vetoed a bill to extend the bureau for another year on the grounds that the
bureau was too costly, created too much patronage, and was unconstitutional.
Congress sustained Johnson’s veto on February 21, and the Radicals
realized their struggle with him would be a bitter one. The presidential veto
raised Johnson’s stock with Democrats all over the country; in California
Democrats hailed his action with torchlight parades, speeches, and the firing of
salutes. The
Union commented, “So
far as the freedmen were concerned, it was comparatively easy to withdraw them
from Johnson’s regard; he was a ‘poor white’ himself, and the
inveterate prejudice of his class against the race, though smothered during the
war, was quickly rekindled.” “As we feared,” the
Elevator said, “President Johnson
has vetoed the Freedmen’s Bureau bill, thus leaving not only the colored
people, but all Unionists and Northern men, whether white or colored, to the
tender mercies of non-repentant rebels, exasperated by defeat and raging for
revenge.”
[16]
In an effort to build their party’s support and
guarantee legal rights for the freed slaves, the Republicans next created the
Civil Rights Act. This act attempted to settle the question of African American
citizenship. The Act declared that “all persons born in the United States
and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed,” are
citizens of the United States. The act also said that citizens of “every
race and color” were to have equal rights in all states to make contracts,
to sue, to testify in court, and to buy and sell real or personal property. In
addition, all citizens were to have “full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of person and property,” and to be
subjected to “like punishments, pains and penalties, and to no
other.” The act gave the Executive Department and the federal courts ample
power to carry out is provisions. But Johnson vetoed this act on March 27, 1866,
only to have Congress override his veto two weeks later. Armed with this
victory, the Republicans revived the Freedmen’s Bureau bill and in July
1866 passed this measure over the President’s ever ready
veto.
[17]
The
San Francisco
Examiner labeled the Civil Rights Act “an infamous, blasphemous and
beastly attempt to break down the barriers which God Almighty has erected, and
to mongrelize, debase, and degrade distinct natural species, which in His
wisdom, he has made separate.” The
Union objected to Johnson’s
attempt to “excite prejudice” on the Pacific Coast by saying the
Civil Rights Act would make citizens of the Chinese. “The veto message,
the newspaper said, “teems with caste prejudice, and gives further
evidence of the fact that we have now a President who is as anxious for the
conservation of his Caucasian dignity as Jeff. Davis himself.” The
Union pointed out that the number of
Chinese born in the United States was limited, and in a later editorial praised
the Chinese as industrious and ingenious. “The simple solution of the
terrible Mongolian problem,” the paper said, “is to turn to all
possible account the cheap labor thus placed at our command, to guarantee the
laborers the protection of just and equal laws, to abate prejudice and to try to
convert them to Christianity.” Chinese suffrage and citizenship, which
would prove such valuable issues for the Democrats in 1867, were already
becoming more prominent.
[18]
The
Suffrage QuestionIn California debate over black franchise
rights continued unchecked. In May 1865 black leader John J. Moore had listed
ten reasons for black voting rights. One of the reasons he cited was
“Because political suffrage is the only means by which men can defend
their personal, civil, and religious liberties, . . .” Moore also
asserted, “The Negro American must have the right of suffrage to arm him
with the means of self-defense against the ignorance and prejudice of foreign
immigration that sets itself in array against the American negro, as soon as he
lands upon our shores, particularly the ignorant and disloyal Irish.”
Moore asked, too, why whites never questioned the right of ignorant white men to
vote.
[19]
In February 1866, United States Senator-elect
Cornelius Cole told a Union Party meeting that Americans must live up to the
ideals of the Declaration of Independence. Cole stressed that to preserve
“our standing among the nations we must mete out justice to the Africans
as well as to all other races of men. . . . A poor satisfaction indeed it would
be to feel that one’s own race is great only in contrast, and poorer still
to know that it has attained superiority by mounting over the ruins of feebler
races.” Cole added that if anything could be done to atone for oppressing
the “benighted bondsmen of the South,” it should “be
cheerfully done.” He thought, too, that “if it should be necessary
to confer upon him the elector’s privilege, even that should be done, and
not grudgingly.”
[20]
Democrat Thomas J. Henley, however, speaking at a
meeting to endorse Johnson’s policies, recommended welcoming the Southern
states as the Prodigal Son had been welcomed and declared:
We must now have equality, fraternity and
brotherly love; and when I speak of equality and fraternity, I wish it
distinctly understood that I mean for the white men. I mean the Anglo-Saxon, the
Norman, and the Celt—the Caucasian wherever he is to be found. I expressly
exclude the Mongolian, the African and the Kanaka [Hawaiians], the inhabitants
of the South Sea Islands, and the cannibals of New Zealand.
Later in March 1866, Editor B.F. Washington of the
Examiner complained, “it is hard
to argue with men who will contend for the equality of races,” because it
shows a “morbid condition of mind utterly inconsistent with healthy
discussion.” The newspaper explained that “Man’s
mission—his upon whose forehead the seal of universal empire has been
stamped—the Caucasian man’s mission, is to subdue the earth, bend it
to his use and make it subservient to the highest civilization. In this all
things should be made to contribute.” Washington contended that in slavery
“the Negro has made his only advance in civilization. . . . We are
prepared to say . . . that negro slavery . . . was a
blessing.”
[21]
Perhaps in response to the rhetoric of white
supremacy, resistance to black suffrage hardened in California. The legislature
ignored the petition and proposed amendment to the California Constitution
suggested by the Colored Convention of 1865. In 1866 the committee in charge of
San Francisco’s Fourth of July celebration refused blacks permission to
join the Independence Day festivities, although they had been welcome the year
before. At least one San Francisco newspaper, the
Evening Tribune, criticized the
decision to exclude African Americans, calling it a “gross outrage on
common decency.” The paper said, “To allow loyal negroes to
celebrate Independence day does not touch the question of social or political
equality of the races. . . .Let
all
American citizens be allowed to
celebrate.” But rights of citizenship may have been just what San
Franciscans wanted to reject because of their implications with regard to
suffrage. In a revealing editorial written just before the Fourth, the
Examiner exulted that the Civil Rights
bill had “given the negro no solitary right he had not before. The ban of
social prescription is still upon him. He is denied access to our theatres,
hotels, and churches, except on humiliating terms. He cannot sit upon our juries
or occupy our offices. He is, in short, socially and politically, a proscribed
individual.”
[22]
The
Fourteenth AmendmentWell aware that blacks’ rights were
still in jeopardy and concerned about the constitutionality of the Civil Rights
Act, Congress next moved to put the substance of that bill into an amendment to
the Constitution. What was needed the Radical Republicans thought, was an
ironclad guarantee of the freedmen’s rights. Nevertheless, the Radicals
still lacked the confidence to state unequivocally that African Americans now
possessed the vote. As a result the amendment was a compromise between the
moderates and the radicals that satisfied very few; still, its phrases were
ambiguous enough that each group was able to interpret the amendment to suit
itself. The first section defined citizenship: “All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” This
section also said: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.” The second section said that any state that
denied suffrage to any of its adult male citizens would have its representation in Congress
proportionally reduced. The third section was an attempt to nullify the
President’s pardoning power by disqualifying from state or federal office
anyone who had sworn to uphold the Constitution and then engaged in
rebellion.
[23]
The third section reflected the Radicals’ fear
that the Southern plantation owners would regain complete political power in the
South. The Radicals thought the Southern states had to be restored to the Union
in a way that avoided nullifying the North’s victory. Recognition of the
Johnson governments was not the answer because they were led by men opposed to
the Republicans who already had made tentative moves toward Democrats in the
North. If they were readmitted, the Southerners might attempt to end the
Freedmen’s Bureau, restore slavery, repudiate the Federal war debt, or
even assume the debts of the Confederacy. The Radicals relied on black suffrage
as one solution to these problems.
[24]
The Fourteenth Amendment disappointed Radicals like
Charles Sumner and Thaddeus Stevens. Stevens called it a “shilly-shally
bungling thing,” and abolitionist Wendell Phillips described it as a
“fatal and total surrender.” During the debates on the amendment in
Congress, Union-Republican William Higby raised the issue of Chinese
citizenship, saying, “The Chinese are nothing but a pagan race. . . . You
cannot make good citizens of them.” Higby, who was from Calaveras,
California, faulted the Chinese on the grounds of religion, customs, and morals,
charging, “They buy and sell their women like cattle, and the trade is
mostly for prostitution.” But the
Stockton Independent declared,
“The case presented is: whether the black man shall have the ballot at the
south, or the rebels shall rule the politics and destiny of the country, with a
fair prospect of ultimately ruling in the councils of the Nation. If the former
prevails, the Union cause is as safe in South Carolina as in
Massachusetts.” Even the Radicals hesitated to enforce black suffrage only
in the South, however, and they were not yet confident enough to propose it for
the country at large.
[25]
The Congressional Committee on Reconstruction had
recommended that no state be readmitted to the Union before ratifying the
Fourteenth Amendment. But by the end of 1866, Texas, South Carolina, Georgia,
Florida, North Carolina, Arkansas, and Alabama had all rejected the measure.
Equally encouraged by President Johnson’s attitude toward the amendment,
in early 1867 Virginia, Louisiana, and Mississippi also refused to ratify. In
California Governor Frederick F. Low considered calling a special session of the
legislature to ratify the amendment because the next session would not convene
until after the election of September 1867. Low may have anticipated a
Democratic victory, but he decided not to call the special session. In his final
message as governor, Low recommended passage of the amendment. The Republican
Senate recommended ratification in a resolution, but another resolution in the
California Assembly rejected the measure; both resolutions died in committee. As
a result, the legislature never acted on the amendment and it was not until May
6, 1959, that California finally ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment.
[26]
The Fourteenth Amendment and Johnson’s attitude
toward it became major issues in the Congressional elections of 1866. In late
August and early September the president made a politically disastrous speaking
tour as far west as Chicago. The issues between him and Congress in this
particularly bitter campaign were thoroughly aired. Johnson continuously
attacked Congress, the Civil Rights Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment. He
engaged in angry exchanges with hecklers, and as a result of the tour lost
substantial support. In California the
San
Francisco Morning Call, a moderate Union paper, commented that Thaddeus
Stevens’ policy was “on trial before the people,” and although
the Congressmen elected in the Eastern states would not take their seats until
December 1867, “Yet the Fall elections will probably control the action of
the next session of Congress.” In September 1866, the
Call lamented, “If the Radicals
are successful, the present uncertain condition of the country will be
maintained indefinitely; we shall have negro suffrage everywhere, and perhaps
something worse.” Earlier in the year, the
Elevator had chided the
Call for its attitude towards black
suffrage and its fear of Chinese voters. “The rulers of this State have
encouraged Chinese immigration until they have flooded the country with
idolators [
sic]” the
Elevator wrote, “and why deprive
them of the rights which are accorded to other foreigners?” The
Elevator doubted that the Chinese would
change their citizenship, however, because “They are too fond of the
customs and institutions of their own celestial kingdom; . . .” But as the
Call’s attitude showed, in
California the Democrats would not be alone in their opposition to African
American suffrage with its implications for Chinese voting
rights.
[27]
By September 1866, Northern voters feared that
President Johnson was losing the peace, and they were ready to let the
Republicans control Reconstruction. The elections gave the party the required
voter support—the Republicans took control of every northern state
legislature, won every northern gubernatorial contest, and gained more than
two-thirds majorities in both houses of Congress. The
Call observed:
The result of the elections which have already been held
in the Eastern States proves conclusively that the great mass of the people of
the Northern States are decidedly in favor of what is popularly considered to be
the congressional plan of reconstruction. . . . Though the people have decided
in favor of the amendment plan, they have not yet decided in favor of the plans
of the ultra-Radicals, yet their votes have greatly strengthened the Radicals
morally and increased the influence of Thad. Stevens and Co.
The
Call
prophesied that the Radicals would take charge of reconstruction and that black
suffrage would be “enforced at the point of the bayonet, even if worse
evils do not befall the
country.”
[28]
The Radicals assumed a mandate even if they did not
have one. The Republicans passed an act giving the vote to blacks in the
District of Columbia. They created a series of Reconstruction Acts, all vetoed
by Johnson and passed again, which set up military governments in the South.
These governments required suffrage for African Americans. Finally, after
Ulysses S. Grant’s election in 1868, and in the face of continuing
Northern opposition, the Republicans hammered out the Fifteenth Amendment. In
California Democrats as well as moderate Republicans opposed the Radical
program. Democratic legislators again voiced their displeasure through
resolutions. For example, on December 16, 1867, Assemblyman John M. James
introduced a resolution to direct California’s Congressional
representatives “to use their exertions . . . to restore the ten southern
states, . . . to the same and equal constitutional rights with all the other
states.” Democratic Senator A. H. Rose proposed a resolution
saying:
. . .
the people of California are irreconciliably
[
sic] opposed to conferring the
elective franchise upon negroes or Chinese; that Congress has no constitutional
power to regulate the elective franchise in the Southern states, . . . and
“that any attempt to make such a regulation by congress is a usurpation of
power against which this legislature . . . doth solemnly
protest.
[29]
Black suffrage was the main issue of the 1865 election
in California, an election that began the serious breakup of the Union Party. In
1867, however, the emphasis shifted to Chinese naturalization and voting rights.
A growing realization of the implications of the Radical program created a kind
of mass panic that gave the Democrats a sweeping victory at the
polls.
Notes: Chapter IV
[1]
Eric Foner,
Reconstruction: America’s
Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers,
1984), 193. Kenneth M. Stampp,
The Era of
Reconstruction, 1865-1867 (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), 61-62, 72-73,
77, 79-80; John Hope Franklin,
Reconstruction:
After the Civil War (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961),
26-27, 29-31.
[2]
Stampp,
Reconstruction, 110; James G.
Randall and David Donald,
The Civil War and
Reconstruction (2d. ed., rev., Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1969), 580.
[3]
Stampp,
Reconstruction, 12, 87, 105;
Ray H. Abrams, “Copperhead Newspapers and the Negro,”
Journal of Negro History, 20 (April
1935), 152; Leslie H. Fishel, Jr., “Northern Prejudice and Negro Suffrage,
1865-1870,”
Journal of Negro
History, 39 (January 1954), 11; Forrest G. Wood,
Black Scare: The Racist Response to
Emancipation and Reconstruction (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1968), 82, 92; For a fuller discussion and interpretation of Republican
motives see Lawanda and John Cox, “Negro Suffrage and Republican Politics;
The Problem of Motivation in Reconstruction Historiography,”
Journal of Southern History, 33 (August
1967), 303-330. The Coxes wrote, “In challenge to the dominant
interpretation from Braxton through Gillette, we should like to suggest that
Republican party leadership played a crucial role in committing this nation to
equal suffrage for the Negro not because of political expediency but despite
political risk. An incontestable fact of Reconstruction history suggests this
view. Racial prejudice was so strong in the North that the issue of equal Negro
suffrage constituted a clear and present danger to Republicans. White backlash
might be a recently coined phrase, but it was a virulent political phenomenon in
the 1860s. The exploitation of prejudice by the Democratic opposition was
blatant and unrestrained.” See p. 317.
[4]
Ralph J. Roske,
Everyman’s Eden; A
History of California (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1968), 317-319;
San Francisco Daily Alta California,
July 29, 1865, p. 2, col. 2; Winfield J. Davis,
History of Political Conventions in
California, 1849-1892, (Sacramento: Publications of the California State
Library, No. 1, 1893), 196-97.
[5]
Roske,
Everyman’s Eden, 374;
Theodore Henry Hittell,
History of
California (4 vols. San Francisco: N.J. Stone, 1897), 4:393.
[6]
San Francisco Daily Examiner, June 12,
1865, p. 1, col. 5; Roske,
Everyman’s
Eden, 318; Davis,
Political
Conventions, 198-99; 201; Hittell,
California, 4:390. Low was the first
California governor to serve a four-year term.
[7]
Eugene H. Berwanger,
The West and
Reconstruction (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1981), 28; Foner,
Reconstruction, 66; California,
Senate
Journal, 16
th Sess., 1865-66,
“First Biennial Message of Governor Frederick F. Low,” Dec. 8, 1865,
54, 55-57; U.S., Constitution, amend. 13, secs. 1 and 2;
Alta, Dec. 7, 1865, p. 1, col. 5, Dec.
16, 1865, p. 1, col. 4; Robert H. Becker, ed.,
Some Reflections of an Early California
Governor, (Sacramento Book Collectors Club, n.p., 1959), 52.
[8]
Hubert Howe Bancroft,
History of
California (7 vols. San Francisco: The History Company, 1886-1890),
VII:303, 317, 323; Thomas E. Malone, “The Democratic Party in California,
1865-68,” (M.A. thesis, Stanford University, 1949), 4-5, 6; Hittell,
California, 4:393-94; Roske,
Everyman’s Eden, 374. Bancroft
(VII:326) used the following quote from the
San Francisco Flag to illustrate
Senator Conness’ political power: “If a popular citizen is suggested
as a suitable person for a certain office, he cannot be nominated without having
been first chalked out on Conness’ slate; he must express his readiness to
pack and eat dirt for the Great Senatorial Manipulator. If we require a member
of the legislature, he must be a friend of our ‘only sober senator.’
If we want a sheriff, the Great Western Prestidigitateur pours him out of a
magic bottle. If we desire a justice of the peace, the Great First Cause creates
one directly. . . .”
[9]
Davis,
Political Conventions, 219, 599;
Malone, “Democratic Party,” 6-8, 10;
Sacramento Daily Union, July 22, 1865,
p. 2, col. 1; For biographical information about Senator Cornelius Cole, see
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=C000607,
accessed April 5, 2004.
[10]
Davis,
Political Conventions, 223-24;
Malone, “Democratic Party,” 12, 22.
[11]San
Francisco Elevator, Aug. 25, 1865, p. 2, col. 2; Malone,
“Democratic Party,” 14, 23-24; Davis,
Political Conventions, 216;
Examiner, Sept. 5, 1865, p. 2, col. 3;
Stockton Independent, Aug. 25, 1865,
quoted in Malone, “Democratic Party,” 24.
[12]
Union, July 17, 1865, p. 3, col. 2;
Elevator, April 7, 1865, p. 2, col. 3,
Aug. 18, 1865, p. 2, col. 4.
[13]
Davis,
Political Conventions, 223;
Malone, “Democratic Party,” 18, 30-32; Roske,
Everyman’s Eden, 375.
[14]
Malone, “Democratic Party,” 51-52; Davis,
Political Conventions, 226, 227, 231,
269; Alta, Dec. 7, 1865, p. 1, col. 5.
[15]
Union, Jan. 26, 1866, p. 2, col. 1;
Fishel, “Northern Prejudice and Negro Suffrage,”11; Wood,
Black Scare, 87. By 1870 the
Sacramento Union was Republican in
orientation.
[16]
Foner,
Reconstruction, 69, 2466-247,
248n37; Franklin,
Reconstruction,
38-39, 58-61; William E.B. DuBois, “Reconstruction and Its
Benefits,”
American Historical
Review, 15 (July 1910), 783; Davis,
Political Conventions, 233;
Union, Feb. 23, 1866, p. 2, col. 2,
April 16, 1866, p. 2, col. 2;
Elevator,
Feb. 23, 1866, p. 2, col. 2.
[17]
Foner,
Reconstruction, 250-251;
Franklin,
Reconstruction, 60; Stampp,
Reconstruction, 135-36.
[18]
Examiner, June 20, 1865, p. 2, col. 1,
March 30, 1866, p. 2, col. 2;
Union,
March 29, 1866, p. 2, col. 2, April 20, 1866, p. 2, col. 2.
[19]
Elevator, May 26, 1865, p. 3, col. 2.
See Wood,
Black Scare, 23-24, 55, and
91 for further evidence and discussion of Irish hostility to blacks.
[20]
Union, Feb. 26, 1866, p. 8, col.
2.
[21]
Examiner, March 2, 1866, p. 1, cols.
2-4, March 21, 1866, p. 2, col. 1.
[22]
James A. Fisher, “A Social History of California Negroes,
1850-1900,” (M.A. thesis, California State University, Sacramento, 1966),
87-88;
San Francisco Evening Tribune,
July 2, 1866, p. 2, cols. 1-2;
Examiner, June 26, 1866, p. 2, col.
1.
[23]
Randall and Donald,
Civil War and
Reconstruction, 580-83; Stampp,
Reconstruction, 136; U.S.,
Constitution, amend. 14, secs. 1, 2,
and 3.
[24]
Randall and Donald,
Civil War and
Reconstruction, 580-581
; Stampp,
Reconstruction, 93.
[25]
Stampp,
Reconstruction, 141-42;
Congressional Globe,
39
th Cong. 1st Sess., Feb. 27, 1866,
1056;
Stockton Independent quoted in
Examiner, April 27, 1866, p. 2, col. 2;
Fishel, “Northern Prejudice,” 15; Randall and Donald,
Civil War and Reconstruction,
583.
[26]
Franklin,
Reconstruction, 67-68;
Union, June 25, 1866, p. 2, col. 2;
California,
Assembly Journal,
17
th Sess., 1867-68, “Second
Biennial Message of Governor Frederick F. Low,” Dec. 2, 1867, 51-52;
Hittell,
California, 4:422; Berwanger,
West and Reconstruction , 120-121. See
also
http://members.tripod.com/bcq/fourteenth_amendment.html,
accessed Nov. 12, 2004.
[27]
Foner, Reconstruction, 264-265; Franklin,
Reconstruction, 65-67; Randall and
Donald,
Civil War and Reconstruction,
584-585; Stampp,
Reconstruction,
114-15;
San Francisco Daily Morning
Call, Aug. 12, 1866, p. 2, col. 2; Sept. 2, 1866, p. 2, col. 2;
Elevator, Jan. 19, 1866, p. 2, col.
3.
[28]
Stampp,
Reconstruction, 117-18;
Call, Oct. 14, 1866, p. 2, col. 2
[29]
Stampp,
Reconstruction, 142, 144;
Fishel, “Northern Prejudice,” 25-26; Davis,
Political Conventions, 268-270. In 1868
California voted for Ulysses S. Grant by a majority of 506 out of a total vote
of 108,000. See Bancroft,
California,
VII:331.