| Research
Interests:
Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics, Philosophy and Psychology of Perception,
Metaethics, and Philosophy of Science
I focus on issues in the area of philosophy
of mind and metaphysics, including the nature of color and perceptual
states, the nature of moral judgment, and the problem of free will.
My work on color motivates and defends the view called physicalism
which holds that colors are physical properties of physical objects.
In "Fitting Color into the Physical World"
I present and defend a version of physicalism, arguing that it provides
the best reconciliation of our ordinary experience of color with
color science.
In "Common Sense about Qualities
and Senses," I argue that the best reconciliation of ordinary
perceptual experience with science holds that perceptual states
have qualitative properties, but that qualitative properties need
not be characterized as qualia (and so as necessarily conscious). And in "Qualia
and the Senses," I reject the claim, which can be attributed
to Grice, that our intuitive distinctions among perceptual modalities
require that perceptual states have qualia. Also undercutting an
argument for qualia, in "Color
Science and Spectrum Inversion: A Reply to Nida-Rumelin"
I show that Nida-Rumelin's case for actual cases of spectrum inversion
on the basis of actual cases of pseudonormal vision depends on phenomenal
internalism, and so can be rejected from the standpoint of phenomenal
externalism.
Concerning the nature of moral judgment
("Explaining Motivated Desires" and "Sensibility
Theory and Conservative Complacency", written with Dale Turner) I consider whether
moral judgments are certain sorts of desires or hybrids of beliefs
and desires often called besires, and find that the dispute between
these two views stems from a deep disagreement over antireductionism.
Regarding the problem of free will
("Empirical
Constraints on the Problem of Free Will"), I attempt to
clarify the current debate by considering how empirical research
can provide constraints for the philosophical debate. I show that
the source of the most powerful constraints is psychological research
into the accuracy of introspection.
Curriculum
Vitae
Links to Courses Spring 2008:
Phl 390, Symbolic Logic II
Phl 453, Cognitive Science
Phl
483, Philosophy of Science
Other Courses:
Phl 201, Introduction to Philosophy (Winter 2008)
Phl 218, Symbolic Logic I (Winter 2008)
Phl 290, Philosophy Proseminar (Winter 2007)
Phl
450, Philosophy of Mind (Fall 2005)
Phl 460, Metaphysics (Winter 2008)
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