On Inequality
A Dissertation On the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality of Mankind
1755
I conceive that there are two kinds of inequality among the human species; one, which I call natural
or physical, because it is established by nature, and consists in a difference of age, health, bodily
strength, and the qualities of the mind or of the soul: and another, which may be called moral or
political inequality, because it depends on a kind of convention, and is established, or at least
authorized by the consent of men. This latter consists of the different privileges, which some men
enjoy to the prejudice of others; such as that of being more rich, more honoured, more powerful or
even in a position to exact obedience.
On Natural Man
It appears, at first view, that men in a state of nature, having no moral relations or determinate
obligations one with another, could not be either good or bad, virtuous or vicious; unless we take
these terms in a physical sense, and call, in an individual, those qualities vices which may be
injurious to his preservation, and those virtues which may contribute to it; in which case , he
would have to be accounted most virtuous, who put least check on the pure impulses of nature. But
without deviating from the ordinary sense of the words, it will be proper to suspend the judgment
we might be led to form on such a state and be on our guard against our prejudices, till we have
weighed the matter in the scales of impartiality, and seen whether virtues or vices preponderate
among civilized men, and whether their virtues do them more good than their vices do harm; till we
have discovered, whether the progress of the sciences sufficiently indemnifies them for the
mischiefs they do one another, in proportion as they are better informed of the good they ought to
do; or whether they would not be, on the whole, in a much happier condition if they had nothing to
fear or to hope from any one, as they are, subjected to universal dependence, and obliged to take
everything from those who engage to give the nothing in return.
Let us conclude then that man in a state of nature, wandering up and down the forests, without
industry, without speech, and without home, an equal stranger to war and to all ties, neither
standing in need of his fellow-creatures nor having any desire to hurt them, and perhaps even not
distinguishing them one from another; let us conclude that, being self-sufficient and subject to so
few passions, he could have no feelings or knowledge but such as befitted his situation; that he
felt only his actual necessities, and disregarded everything he did not think himself immediately
concerned to notice, and that his understanding made no greater progress than his vanity. If by
accident he made any discovery, he was the less able to communicate it to others, as he did not
know even his own children. Every art would necessarily perish with its inventor, where there was
no kind of education among men, and generations succeeded generations without the least advance;
when, all setting out from the same point, centuries must have elapsed in the barbarism of the
first ages; when the race was already old, and man remained a child.
On Private Property
Where there is no property, there is no injustice.
On Slavery
Since no man has a natural authority over his fellow, and force creates no right,
we must conclude that conventions form the basis of all legitimate authority among men.
To renounce liberty is to renounce being a man, to surrender the rights of humanity and even its
duties. For him who renounces everything no indemnity is possible. Such a renunciation is
incompatible with man's nature; to remove all liberty from his will is to remove all morality from
his acts. Finally, it is an empty and contradictory convention that sets up, on the one side, absolute
authority, and, on the other, unlimited obedience. Is it not clear that we can be under no obligation
to a person from whom we have the right to exact everything? Does not this condition alone, in the
absence of equivalence or exchange, in itself involve the nullity of the act? For what right can my
slave have against me, when all that he has belongs to me, and, his right being mine, this right of
mine against myself is a phrase devoid of meaning?
The Right of Conquest
The right of conquest has no foundation other than the right of the strongest. If war does not give
the conqueror the right to massacre the conquered peoples, the right to enslave them cannot be
based upon a right which does not exist. No one has a right to kill an enemy except when he cannot
make him a slave, and the right to enslave him cannot therefore be derived from the right to kill
him. It is accordingly an unfair exchange to make him buy at the price of his liberty his life, over
which the victor holds no right. Is it not clear that there is a vicious circle in founding the right of
life and death on the right of slavery, and the right of slavery on the right of life and death?
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